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Introduction: Setting the Stage
Tuula Sakaranaho, Timo Aarrevaara, and Johanna Konttori
Abstract Religion has become a pressing matter in different fields of multicultural
European society, which raises the question as to how best to govern religious diver-
sity. What we argue in this book is that a successful governance of religious diversity
necessitates the development of religious literacy. As such, religious literacy can
be understood in a variety of ways depending on the particular context. This book
draws on different empirical case studies concerning Finland, covering traditional
Finnish religious movements and issues pertaining to immigration and the growing
ethnic and religious diversity of Finnish society. In doing so, it delves, among other
matters, into the field of school education and state policies against radicalization
and violence.
Keywords Religious literacy · Diversity · Governance · Finland
1 Pitfalls of Religious Illiteracy
In contemporary European society, approaches towards religion in the public sphere
tend to be very contradictory. In the 1960s, many sociologists envisaged that the
process of secularization would result in religion becoming obsolete in the European
public sphere and hence relegated solely to the private sphere of personal belief and
practice. This has not happened, however. For instance, religion is regularly in the
headlines of world politics and security issues. In particular, social media has become
a medium for personal opinions and even a platform for hate talk, in which religion
is seen as a root cause of social problems faced by a multicultural European society.
At the same time, the importance of religion in the public sphere is not necessarily
recognized, or it is avoided as an awkward subject, due to the idea that religion does
not concern the secular world. In the latter case, religion is seen as a matter best left
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aside in the work of administrators and in the health and service sectors. In practice,
the price paid for this line of thought is the spread of religious illiteracy.
In our view, religion is a pressing matter in all fields of a plural society. This
raises the question of how best to govern religious diversity. What we argue in this
book is that a successful governance of religious diversity requires the development
of religious literacy. Only by the development of religious literacy is it possible
to avoid the two main pitfalls that religious illiteracy may produce. On the one
hand, religious illiteracy is obvious in cases where issues pertaining to religion are
not recognized. In Finland, this may concern the members of traditional revivalist
movements or new immigrant communities who follow certain rules arising from
their religious convictions, especially in relation to sexuality and family. On the
other, religious illiteracy may be apparent in converse cases where religion is taken
as the main explanatory factor when dealing with certain ethnic and religious groups.
Islam, in particular, is a religion that tends to attract stereotypes which gloss over
other personal factors, including age, class, race, gender, and cultural differences.
To put it simply, not all Muslims are religious or wish to be treated as such. Both
of the aforementioned pitfalls can be avoided through the ability to understand and
encounter religious diversity in a constructive manner. This kind of proficiency lies
at the heart of religious literacy.
2 Approaching Religious Literacy
In recent decades, the metaphor of “literacy” has become very popular when
describing the aims of a culturally sensitive education or social services (cultural
literacy) or as the ability to critically approach the media, especially social media
(media literacy). In a similar fashion, we utilize the metaphor of religious literacy
in order to emphasize the need for sensitivity to religion, which as a very complex
matter can take many forms and play many roles in contemporary society. As such,
religious literacy is a contested concept and can be understood in a variety of ways.
(See Biesta et al. 2019.) Because it is also context-specific, it has been suggested that
what is actually needed is religious literacies (Davie and Dinham 2019, 25–26).
Research on religious literacy has its roots in the Anglo-American world. The
concept has gained momentum notably through the work of Stephen Prothero (e.g.
Prothero 2007), Diane L. Moore (e.g. Moore 2015), and Adam Dinham (with his
colleagues) (e.g. Dinham et al. 2009; Dinham 2015b). There are different broad
views on religious literacy, among them theological, sociological, and culturalist
approaches (see Dinham and Jones 2010; Kähkönen 2016). To offer some definitions
for religious literacy to start with, we mention the following.
Dinham and Jones (2010, 6) have collected points of consensus among the
different approaches:
We suggest that religious literacy lies, then, in having the knowledge and skills to recognise
religious faith as a legitimate and important area for public attention, a degree of general
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knowledge about at least some religious traditions, and an awareness of and ability to find
out about others.
Its purpose is to avoid stereotypes, respect and learn from others, and build good relations
across difference. In this it is a civic endeavour rather than a theological or religious one, and
seeks to support a strong, cohesive, multi-faith society, which is inclusive of people from all
faith traditions and none in a context that is largely suspicious and anxious about religion
and belief.
Diane L. Moore’s definition, adopted by the American Academy of Religion, is
specifically targeted at educators and aims at fostering understanding of religions.
According to Moore (2015, 30–31),
Religious literacy entails the ability to discern and analyze the fundamental intersections of
religion and social/political/cultural life through multiple lenses. Specifically, a religiously
literate person will possess 1) a basic understanding of the history, central texts (where appli-
cable), beliefs, practices and contemporary manifestations of several of the world’s religious
traditions as they arose out of and continue to be shaped by particular social, historical
and cultural contexts; and 2) the ability to discern and explore the religious dimensions of
political, social and cultural expressions across time and place.
Religious literacy has often been studied in the context of education (e.g. Conroy
2015; Moore 2014; Dinham et al. 2017; Biesta et al. 2019) but also in relation to
the media (Lövheim 2012), welfare (Dinham 2015a), radicalization, and extremism
(Francis et al. 2015), law (Melloni and Cadeddu 2019), political discourse (Kont-
tori 2019), and NGOs (Siirto and Hammar 2016). In this book we approach reli-
gious literacy in different contexts, such as city politics, mosque associations, and
state administration. The chapters are connected to the research project on religious
literacy, funded by the Finnish Cultural Foundation (2019–2020).
In Religious Literacy in Policy and Practice, Dinham and Francis (2015, 3)
summarize religious literacy, first, as a matter of general interest and, second, as
something that is specific to a particular context. The book at hand combines these
two approaches in order to highlight the importance of religious literacy in a plural-
izing and secularizing European society while utilizing empirical cases concerning
religious literacy in the national context of Finland. However, it does not treat reli-
gious literacy as taken for granted but rather as needing to be problematized as a
general concept used when referring to religion and religious diversity in European
society.
In a similar fashion as many other European countries, Finland has undergone
rapid social change invariably linked with processes of secularization and globaliza-
tion. On the one hand, Finnish society is very secular, and hence religion does not
dictate what people believe or how they behave. At the same time, partly due to immi-
gration, there is an urgent need to come to terms with growing social, cultural, and
religious diversity, as well as to develop social policies that address specific issues
linked with different religious traditions and arising from this diversity. (See Sorsa
2018; Illman et al. 2017; Ketola et al. 2011.) It is obvious that some sort of discrep-
ancy exists between these two forces. Due to the process of secularization, people’s
knowledge and understanding of religion are diminishing at the very moment when
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it would be most needed. One answer to this problem is to develop general religious
literacy (see Davie 2015).
We fully agree with Dinham and Francis that data and new theories are needed
in order to complement or alter the perceptions of religion in religious education
in school or in the study of religions at the university level (see also Nash and
Bishop 2010; Biesta et al. 2019). Even more so, a new understanding is needed with
respect to popular and media portrayals of religion, or in relation to public discussion
about religion. However, we are somewhat critical of the view that, with the help of
religious literacy, one could “reveal a real religious landscape”, as argued byDinham
and Francis (2015, 3, italics ours). The epistemological starting point of this volume
lies in social constructivism, on the basis of which we approach religious literacy as
a conceptual lens that, when put into practice, can produce different versions of a
religious landscape.
In Finnish society, there are many situations where there is a grave lack of mutual
trust and understanding between different parties (for instance, the administration and
industry). For decades, Finland was understood to be a nation that shares common
values. The increase of multicultural and secular features of Finnish society has
somewhat changed the situation. In order to come to terms with the complexities of
a diversifying and secularizing society, it is necessary to look at religious literacy
from the perspective of multi-level governance, where a state-centred analysis is
broadened to the processes of decentralization of traditional administrative functions
and hence to civil society, businesses or international organizations, such as the
European Union. By utilizing the approach of multi-level governance, in addition
to focusing on formal organizations one can also examine networks and financial
instruments related to policy programs or international agreements.Moreover, multi-
level governance makes it possible to take into account how cultures and religions
can function as a resource and as a means of co-cooperation in the public sphere.
Being a strength of society, multiculturalism enables the use of versatile governance
tools. (See Martikainen 2013.)
The aim of this book is to add to the capacity for better governance, decision-
making, and societal interaction. We are looking for ways in which religious literacy
can make available operational resources for actors in multi-level governance. This
knowledge is essential for religious communities, working life, public decision-
making, and public-funded service structures. We also aim to encourage readers to
find solutions based on religious literacy that go beyond traditional conflicts. The
chapters of this bookpresent newways ofworkingwith religious communities, public
authorities, and citizens by using deliberative methods to find sustainable solutions.
3 Summary of the Chapters
This book consists of seven chapters in total. Following the introduction, five
thematic chapters investigate religious literacy in relation to both majority and
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minority religions in Finland: the Evangelical Lutheran Church, Islam, and Conser-
vative Laestadianism.What ties these chapters together is their common aim towards
understanding the forms of religious literacy, as well as religious illiteracy, present
in different contexts and communities in Finnish society.
Teemu Pauha and Johanna Konttori investigate statements made by candidates
in the Helsinki City Council election in 2017 regarding the plan to build “a grand
mosque” inHelsinki. They ask how Islam in general and themosque project in partic-
ular are represented in the data. In the statements, what are the blind spots regarding
religion? In what ways is religion misunderstood or even misrepresented? In their
analysis, Pauha and Konttori identify the main discourses, or ways of representing,
Islam and the mosque project, including the strong emphasis put on the freedom
of religion in general. These discourses present Islam, and the mosque project in
particular, as somewhat challenging to the freedom of religion, reflecting problems
that could come along with the building of the mosque, as well as vis-à-vis Islam as a
religion, in relation to foreignness. The authors argue that even in a secular country,
politicians need to have knowledge about religions in order to be able to make
fact-based decisions regarding issues related to them and religious communities.
TapioNykänen andAiniLinjakumpu focus onConservativeLaestadianism,which
is the biggest revival movement inside the Finnish Lutheran Church and the largest
Christian revival movement in Scandinavia. In their chapter, they scrutinize the
regional and municipal political role of Conservative Laestadianism in the northern
parts of the Finnish “Bible Belt”, where the movement has prominent support, and
they also examine the business networks of Conservative Laestadians. The authors
aim to understand what features of politics and business exercised by Laestadians or
associatedwith them should be recognized or understood as “Laestadian”.Moreover,
they ask, what does it mean for regional public life if the religion has an effect on
the actions of Laestadian politicians and entrepreneurs? Do politics and business in
the core regions of the movement become “Laestadianized”? In other words, how
strong is the sociopolitical and financial influence of Conservative Laestadianism in
the regions where the movement has strong support?
Inkeri Rissanen, Martin Ubani and Tuula Sakaranaho focus on three particular
manifestations of religious illiteracy, and they analyse how these influence the gover-
nance of religious diversity in Finnishmulti-faith schools. These threemanifestations
of religious illiteracy, which have emerged in their previous case studies, are: (1)
simplified ways of making distinctions between religion and culture, (2) an inability
to recognize and handle intra-religious diversity, and (3) naturalization of the Protes-
tant conceptions of religion, culture, and citizenship. A theme that runs across these
aspects of religious illiteracy is how they reflect the tendencies of either religion-
ization or “religion-blindness”. To conclude, the chapter reflects on the question of
how to develop the governance of religious diversity in Finnish schools so that the
pitfalls of religious illiteracy can be avoided.
Mulki Al-Sharmani and SannaMustasaari draw on past research (conducted sepa-
rately by each of the authors) and ongoing joint research on the processes through
which Muslims in Finland secure divorces, both Islamic and civil. The authors focus
on how Finnish Muslims of Somali background draw on norms of both state law
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and Islamic law in their divorce practices in a non-binary way. They also examine
how certain selected Helsinki mosques understand Islamic divorce in relation to
court-issued civil divorce, and how they see their role and authority vis-à-vis that of
state institutions in the processes of arbitrating divorce disputes and issuing Islamic
divorces. The analysis problematizes three central points. The first is the assumed
homogeneity and fixedness of what is “religious” about the divorce processes and
how the concept of religious literacy can advance understanding of Islamic family
law with regard to women’s agency. The second point is the assumed oppositional
relationship between “secular” and “religious” (read Islamic) divorce reflected in
state laws and discourses, as well as in Muslim divorce practices. The last point
concerns the insufficient attention to the importance of gender and impact of mosque
mediation and arbitration in family disputes, particularly in relation to women’s
agency.
Marja Tiilikainen andTarjaMankkinen discuss in their chapter how the authorities
in Finland have juggled, on one hand, the need to build good and trusted relation-
ships with Muslim communities and to support the creation of a tolerant multi-
cultural society, and on the other hand, the need to prevent violent radicalization
and extremism in Finland without stigmatizing Muslim communities. The authors
understand religious literacy as a kind of sensitivity among the authorities to reli-
gion and religious communities. Empirically, the chapter is based on analysis of two
national action plans for the prevention of violent extremism, as well asMankkinen’s
long-term experience with security-related issues at the Ministry of the Interior.
The book ends with a conclusion that brings together the different contexts of reli-
gious (il)literacy discussed in the previous chapters and then looks at their similarities
and differences. Also considered is the impact of the book on academic research and
beyond.
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“There Is Freedom of Religion
in Finland, But…” The Helsinki Mosque
Debate
Teemu Pauha and Johanna Konttori
Abstract In this chapter, we examine statements of Finnish municipal election can-
didates regarding plans to build a “grand mosque” and cultural centre in central
Helsinki. Despite proclaiming support for the universal freedom of religion, the can-
didates were hesitant to apply it to themosque case. Opponents of themosque project
emphasized the Christian heritage of Finland and portrayed the proposedmosque as a
channel throughwhich foreign conflicts could enter Finnish society. Themosquewas
also opposed because it was seen as a “political” project instead of a “religious” one.
The proponents of the mosque, in turn, considered it to be a “Muslim church” and
therefore entitled to the same treatment as Christian houses of worship. The mosque
was also seen as important to the local Muslim community, but very few candidates
considered the possibility of the mosque (or Islam) making a positive contribution to
the broader society. Besides identifying the key discourses, we reflect on them from
a religious literacy perspective.
Keywords Finland · Helsinki · Religious literacy · Discourse · Election · Islam ·
Mosque
1 Introduction
The sociologist of religion Grace Davie has written about the factors that should be
taken into account when talking about religion in present-day Europe. These factors
include, among others, the role that Christianity has played—and still plays—in
European societies, immigration to Europe from different parts of the world (which
has shaped—and still shapes—the religious field of the continent), and the growing
realization that regarding religions and religiosity, Europe is not the model that the
rest of the world follows. In particular, Muslims challenge the traditional ideas,
models and customs of Europe, even by their mere presence. (Davie and Dinham
2019, 17–22.)
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The number of Muslims in Western Europe has grown rapidly since the Second
WorldWar, and in many European countries Islam is now the second largest religion.
This change has sparkedmany political discussions and debates, many of which have
dealt with visible signs of Islamic faith in the predominantly Christian/secular Euro-
pean landscape. Two aspects in particular have aroused suspicions and opposition:
the use of hijabs and niqabs (Nilsson 2018; Konttori 2015; Brems 2014) and the
building and financing of mosques, including the training of the imams working
there (Hashas et al. 2018; Allievi 2009; Cesari 2005).
The discussions and debates concerning Islam and Muslims have varied in their
intensity from country to country, but nevertheless they exist in most Western Euro-
pean countries in one form or another. Finland is no exception. While a small Tatar
community has been living in the country for more than a century, and controversies
and debates rarely concern them in any way, the majority of Muslims in Finland
who immigrated from the early 1990s onwards have received much more attention
from themedia, politicians and ordinary citizens. Questions concerning headscarves,
niqabs, mosques, burial and butchery practices have been raised in Finland, but the
discussions have remained relatively calm.
Currently there are only two purpose-built mosque buildings in Finland. These
are situated in the small town of Järvenpää and in Helsinki, respectively, and belong
to the Tatars. In January 2015, a conglomerate of two Muslim organisations and
an interfaith dialogue group applied for land to build a “grand mosque” and cultural
centre in central Helsinki. The conglomerate wanted to keep themosque independent
of existingMuslim associations, and therefore it created a separate foundation named
Oasis to manage its affairs. (Pauha and Konttori 2019.) The Helsinki mosque project
was debated for several years, receiving a great deal of attention, at least in the capital
region.
One of the main issues during the mosque debate concerned foreign funding. The
organizers of the mosque project had negotiated with Bahrain, and there were fears
thatwith outsidemoney therewould also come foreign influence in relation to the type
of Islam practised in Finland. In addition, the estimated building costs of the mosque
were quite high, totalling over 100 million Euros, and the maintenance costs would
also have been considerable. These aspects led to astonishment and drew criticism.
Another issue was the representativeness of the mosque. It was supposed to be open
to all Muslims, but doubts arose whether in practice the Shi’a would be included.
Furthermore, not all Muslim communities active in Helsinki were supportive of the
project. (Pauha and Konttori 2019; see also Pauha and Martikainen 2017.)
In December 2017, the Urban Environment Division of the City of Helsinki pro-
posed that the Urban Environment committee accept the application and reserve a
plot for the mosque complex, albeit with conditions. Despite this, the committee
unanimously rejected the application in a meeting held the very next week. The
committee concluded that the application was untenable because “the scope of the
project and the still open questions and uncertainty factors, above all the origin of the
funding and the possible effects of the funding sources, do not provide a sustainable
foundation for this solution to be realized.” The mosque plan was scheduled to be
further discussed by the City Board of Helsinki, but after it was rejected by the Urban
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Environment committee, the applicants decided to withdraw the application. (Pauha
and Konttori 2019.)
In this chapter, we investigate comments made by electoral candidates in the
Helsinki City Council election in Spring 2017 and study how they argued either for or
against the mosque plan. The data consists of the responses given by the candidates
to a specific statement presented by the leading daily newspaper in Finland, the
Helsingin Sanomat: “It is possible to build a grand mosque for Helsinki if no city or
state money is spent on the project.” The candidates were asked to rate on a scale of
1–5whether they agreedwith the statement or not, with 1meaning “totally disagree”,
3 meaning “don’t know”, and 5 meaning “totally agree”. Altogether 848 candidates
gave their rating. The distribution of responses is shown in Table 1.
As can be seen in the last row of Table 1, approximately one third of the candidates
were at least somewhat opposed to the mosque project, while little over half were
in favour of it. Opposition to the mosque was strongest among the candidates of the
populist-nationalist Finns Party, centre-right National Coalition Party, Independence
Party (known for being Eurosceptic), and Christian Democrats, while the candidates
of all other parties were generally in favour of the project.
Besides giving numerical ratings, the candidates could justify their answers by
writing open responses. Altogether 630 out of 848 respondents chose to do so. In the
rest of this chapter, we focus on those 630 responses. We have coded their contents
in a bottom-up manner, that is, without a pre-existing coding scheme, using the
following questions as guidance: How are Islam in general and the mosque project
in particular represented in the data? How do the candidates understand religion and
its role in society? What are the blind spots regarding religion in their statements?
We identified several key discourses—ways of representing the issue at hand—
that underlie the responses. In the following we take a closer look at these discourses,
pointing out the main lines of argumentation as well as the rhetorical choices made
to strengthen the candidates’ arguments. In order to exemplify each discourse we
present several illustrative quotes from the data.
We reflect on the discourses from a religious literacy perspective. We understand
religious literacy in the vein of Moore (2007, p. 56) as “the ability to discern and
analyze the fundamental intersections of religion and social/political/cultural life
through multiple lenses”. We have chosen Moore’s approach to religious literacy
because of the emphasis that it places on complex interconnections between religious
and other aspects of social reality. As will be seen in the following pages, religion is
often perceived as problematic insofar as it intertwineswith politics. This is especially
the case with Islam; in public discussion, Islam is regularly portrayed as something
inextricably political, even to the extent of being “politics in religious disguise”.
Accordingly, many of the responses analysed here argue that religion and politics
need to be kept separate, or otherwise they will taint each other. Moore (2007, 2015),
however, thinks differently. For her, the intertwining of religion and politics is not
a problem in itself. Rather, it is just the way things are. Religion is always to some
extent political, and vice versa. Religious literacy is about discerning the subtle ways
in which religion intersects with other fields of human activity.
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Table 1 The distribution of responses (1 = “totally disagree”, 3 = “don’t know”, 5 = “totally
agree”) given to the statement: “It is possible to build a grand mosque to Helsinki, if no city or state
money is spent on the project.”
Party 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Social
Democratic
Party
11 (9.6%) 19
(16.5%)
17
(14.8%)
51
(44.3%)
17
(14.8%)
115
(100.0%)
Centre Party 4 (5.4%) 13
(17.6%)
6 (8.1%) 30
(40.5%)
21
(28.4%)
74
(100.0%)
National
Coalition
Party
21
(18.9%)
48
(43.2%)
6 (5.4%) 29
(26.1%)
7 (6.3%) 111
(100.0%)
Swedish
People’s
Party
1 (2.0%) 8 (16.3%) 5 (8.2%) 29
(59.2%)
7 (14.3%) 49
(100.0%)
Christian
Democrats
39
(54.9%)
15
(21.1%)
6 (8.5%) 9 (12.7%) 2 (2.8%) 71
(100.0%)
Green
League
1 (0.8%) 9 (7.3%) 13
(10.6%)
65
(52.8%)
35
(28.5%)
123
(100.0%)
Left Alliance 5 (4.8%) 9 (8.6%) 10 (9.5%) 56
(53.3%)
25
(23.8%)
105
(100.0%)
Finns Party 62
(72.1%)
10
(11.6%)
3 (3.5%) 7 (8.1%) 4 (4.7%) 86
(100.0%)
Communist
Party
3 (8.1%) 4 (10.8%) 2 (5.4%) 15
(40.5%)
13
(35.1%)
37
(100.0%)
Liberal Party 0 (0.0%) 3 (20.0%) 2 (13.3%) 5 (33.3%) 5 (33.3%) 15
(100.0%)
Pirate Party 2 (8.3%) 2 (8.3%) 1 (4.2%) 7 (29.2%) 12
(50.0%)
24
(100.0%)
Feminist
Party
1 (4.3%) 6 (26.1%) 0 (0.0%) 14
(60.9%)
2 (8.7%) 23
(100.0%)
Independence
Party
4 (57.1%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (14.3%) 0 (0.0%) 7 (100.0%)
Othera 2 (25.0%) 1 (12.5%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (37.5%) 2 (25.0%) 8 (100.0%)
Total 156
(18.4%)
148
(17.5%)
71 (8.4%) 321
(37.9%)
152
(17.9%)
848
(100.0%)
aThe “Other” category includes independent candidates and parties with three or fewer candidates
(e.g. the Animal Justice Party and Communist Workers’ Party)
Moore (2015) advocates a cultural studies approach as an antidote to diminishing
religious literacy. According to her, such an approach entails, for example, three
central claims with regard to religion: first, religions are not monolithic but internally
diverse; secondly, religions are not static but evolving and changing; and lastly,
religions do not function in an isolated “religious” sphere but influence all aspects
of culture. As we will demonstrate in the following pages, these three claims can
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provide a valuable corrective to the blind spots demonstrated by the comments of
the electoral candidates.
We argue that even in a secular country, politicians need to have knowledge
about religions in order to be able to make fact-based decisions on issues related to
religions and religious communities. Questions regarding religious literacy do not
concern only Islam, but they still often have something to do with it, especially in
contemporary Western Europe, where the number of Muslims and the significance
of Islam have grown rapidly.
2 Domestic Christianity, Foreign Islam
The first hegemonic discourse that we identified in our data constructs a juxtaposition
between Christianity and Islam, with the former as something Finnish while the latter
is not. Several of the responses mentioned conflicts that would supposedly be caused
by the mosque. These conflicts were typically portrayed as imported from abroad.
The general idea appeared to be that foreign funding would be accompanied by a
radical agenda that in some unspecified way might permeate into the Finnish Mus-
lim community. The idea that radicalism could develop inside the Finnish Muslim
community without foreign involvement was not taken into account. Both of these
ideas held religious ideologies and communities to be static: if the foreign funder
had some sort of an agenda, it would simply be transferred to Finland, and Muslims
in the country would accept it without any critical thinking.
On the other hand, the transfer of the conservative thoughts of the foreign funders to the
Finnish Muslim population causes threatening visions. (Male, Liberal Party, 4)1
No Saudi money for Helsinki. It does not come free of charge. Elsewhere radicalization has
been significant in mosques funded by Saudi Arabia. (Male, Finns Party, 1)
In the latter statement, it is noted (with no further specification) that funding of a
mosque bySaudiArabia has led to radicalization “elsewhere”. This is one of themany
examples of how the Helsinki mosque debate was transnational by nature. Several
respondents referred to experiences in other countries, and thus the debate was never
only about Helsinki and Finland. Quite obviously, this also has a lot to dowith the fact
that the funding of the mosque was coming from abroad. The transnational aspect
of the debate will be discussed further on.
Another thing to note is the vagueness of the statement. The respondent does not
give any indication of which countries or mosques he is referring to. The statement
gives the impression that the respondent has studied the issue, as he is referring
to previous mosque projects, but the vagueness actually takes a lot of credibility
away. While it is true that foreign funding and influence over European Muslims
has had effects in the European context (see, e.g., Rohe 2019), it would be too
1The number in parentheses refers to the numerical rating (1= “totally disagree”, 3= “don’t know”,
5 = “totally agree”) given to the statement: “It is possible to build a grand mosque to Helsinki, if
no city or state money is spent on the project.”
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much to claim that all of the Saudi-funded mosques in Europe are extremist or
radical actors (Inge 2016, 28–29). The word “elsewhere” in the statement gives the
impression that Saudi funding and radicalization go hand in hand. Also, and quite
interestingly, in statementswhich bring up the threat of radicalization in Finland there
is no specification of who would bring that radicalization. One possible actor could
be imams. Whether imams should be trained in Europe or, for example, in Saudi
Arabia has been debated and investigated in many European countries (Hashas et al.
2018), Finland included (Martikainen and Latvio 2018). It is somewhat surprising
that imams were only rarely mentioned in the data.
The fear of radicalization being brought from abroad is evident in the following
statement as well:
As far as we know, the funding would come from actors supportive of the ultraconservative
Salafi branch of Islam, which might further the spread of radical thought in Finland. (Male,
Liberal Party, 2)
Why was radicalization perceived solely as a threat from abroad? Arguably, this
may demonstrate the extent to which popular conceptions of Islam are based on
media coverage. Raittila and Maasilta (2008) have noted that when discussing Islam
in other countries, Finnish newspapers have a strong tendency to associate it with
terrorism and political violence. However, the same kind of association is not made
in newspaper stories that are about Islam and Muslims in Finland. When Finnish
Muslims are described as being involved in conflicts, the conflicts are between Islamic
religious practices and the Finnish legislation, and not violent in nature. (Raittila and
Maasilta 2008.)
The statement above also mentions “the ultraconservative Salafi branch of Islam”,
linking it to “radical thought”. As Inge (2016) has noted, Salafism is often assumed
to be both a political and (potentially) violent movement, even though the opposite
is often the truth. Here, religious illiteracy appears to manifest itself in the form of
a lack of knowledge. Inge conducted her research on Salafi women in London and
Birmingham, and she notes that all of the Salafi communities that she got to know
during her fieldwork were categorically against both political action and violence.
We cannot know for sure what the candidate of the Liberal Party meant by “radical
thought”, but at least some connection with either political or violent action can be
assumed.
All in all, it remains unclear whether the candidates were primarily worried
about violent extremism or anti-liberal values, because they associated the mosque
project (with little elaboration) with both. However, as Moore (2015) has empha-
sized, religious literacy involves an awareness of the internal diversity of religious
traditions. It is necessary, for example, to acknowledge the distinction between
religious conservatism and religiously motivated violence. Conservative religious
groups, both Islamic and otherwise, can be opposed to issues such as gender equality
and democracy, without this translating into violent extremist action.
Besides the potential for conflicts associated with the mosque, Islam in general
was often portrayed as foreign and Christianity as the religion of Finland. It appears
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that a large mosque was seen to be too dominant in the Christian environment and
culture, according to the respondents.
Finland is still a Christian country. (Female, Christian Democrats, 1)
A grand mosque does not fit into the Finnish culture and our way of life. (Male, National
Coalition Party, 1)
Finland is a Christian country. It is not allowed to build large Christian churches in any
Muslim country, and in many cases not any kind of Christian shrine is allowed. (Male,
Social Democratic Party, 1)
The transnational nature of the debate is again visible in the statement in which
it is pointed out that Christians are not allowed to build large churches in Muslim
countries. This statement implicitly suggests that if Christians are not allowed to
build churches in Muslim countries, then Muslims should not be allowed to build a
grand mosque in a Christian country.
The idea of the foreignness of Islam was often conveyed implicitly by unques-
tioningly assuming that Muslims in Finland are immigrants. An example of this is
the following excerpt, which refers to the “home country” of the Muslims. While it
remains unclear what the country in question is, the choice of words shows that it is
certainly not Finland.
I do not think that the Shias and the Sunnis would be able to practise their religion in the
same mosque, as they are not able to do that even in their home country. (Female, Christian
Democrats, 1)
As demonstrated by the examples above, many of the respondents consider Fin-
land to be a “Christian country” or “Christian state”. This is in linewithDavie’s point,
presented earlier, on the significance of Christian heritage in Europe. Coming from
an election candidate, the notion of the Finnish state as “Christian” is problematic
because, at least in the legal sense, it is untrue; despite granting special judicial status
to the Evangelical Lutheran Church and Orthodox Church, Finland has no official
religion, and the state is confessionally neutral (Kääriäinen 2011; Sorsa 2015). How-
ever, as discussed in Pauha (2018) and Pauha and Jasinskaja-Lahti (2013), the public
representations of Finnishness are still very much intertwined with Christianity; this
may maintain the idea of a homogeneously Christian state and, as a result, exclude
religious minorities from perceptions of true Finnishness.
The notion of the Finnish state as “Christian” is especially noteworthy, as it comes
from candidates wishing to represent the capital of Finland. As in many other Euro-
pean countries, (Muslim) immigrants to Finland tend to live in the biggest cities.
Accordingly, Helsinki is probably the most multicultural city in Finland, and its
inhabitants confess an array of different faiths. In this context, the emphasis put
on a “Christian” Finland may represent an ideal held by a candidate, but it hardly
reflects the multireligious reality in the city, in which approximately one half of the
inhabitants are not members of the majority church (Helsingin seurakuntayhtymä
2018).
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3 Contested Boundaries of Religion
A particularly prominent discourse concerned the freedom of religion and its limits.
Regardless of party affiliation, candidates emphasized the necessity for religious
freedom and the equal treatment of all religions by the state. In the very next instant,
however, they often gave reasons for restricting these rights in the case of theHelsinki
mosque project. Frequently used were statements in the vein of “there is freedom of
religion in Finland, but…” Examples of this discourse include:
In the name of freedom of religion, it is of course allowed to build shrines of different
religions in Helsinki, but on the basis of existing knowledge, I do not support this project.
(Male, Green League, 2)
People of all religious denominations need to have their place in Helsinki for religious
practice, but there have been bad experiences of grand mosques elsewhere in the world.
(Female, National Coalition Party, 1)
In the statement above, the mosque debate is once again linked to previous expe-
riences “elsewhere in the world”, and thus the transnational aspect of the debate is
brought up. And again, the statement includes a vague reference to somewhere else in
the world. This vagueness makes it impossible for the voters, or researchers for that
matter, to check the claim concerning bad experiences in relation to grand mosques.
This is apparent in the following statement as well, where the respondent does not
refer only to “bad experiences” but also to hate and terrorism. Again, it is impossible
to know which cases the respondent is referring to. Positive examples from “else-
where” are conspicuously absent. Religious literacy, as understood byMoore, would
require that the heterogeneity of Muslim communities and their mosques receive
attention. Here Islam and grand mosques are presented only in a problem-oriented
manner.
Every religion has the right to have a place where to worship their God. But mosques in other
countries have been used to instigate hate and to support terrorism. (Male, Finns Party, 2)
The statements were often very general and abstract with regard to religious
freedom. A few candidates even quoted directly from the European Convention on
Human Rights or similar treaties. It is not far-fetched to interpret this as an electoral
tactic: bymaking declarations in support of religious freedom, the election candidates
could signal their commitment to general democratic values.
Upon close reading of the statements, it appears that many of the candidates were
operating on the implicit assumption that true religion excludes politics. Accordingly,
the mosque project was perceived as problematic because it was considered to be
political instead of religious—or even political in religious disguise. Some examples
include:
The grand mosque is more of a political project than a possibility to practise religion. (Male,
Left Alliance, 1)
Islam is not a religion, but a conservative political ideology. (Female, Finns Party, 1)
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As van der Veer (1996) has illustrated, the idea of true religion as antithetical
to politics is the product of Western Enlightenment thought, which restricted the
role of religion to the private sphere. True religion, as it is understood in the post-
Enlightenment West, is about harmony and goodwill, whereas politics is about divi-
sion and conflict (van der Veer 1996; see Pauha 2017). Similar views on religion are
conveyed, for example, in the following excerpts:
The core message of all true religions is the same, namely, the equality of and brotherly
love among all people. However, the mosque that is planned for Helsinki would represent
Wahhabism, disguised as Islam. (Male, Independence Party, 1)
In this project religion and politics seem to intertwine, and that might put a strain on relations
between Muslims representing different denominations. (Female, Green League, 4)
It needs to be ensured that the rationally selected location is for practising one’s religion, not
for agitating people. (Male, Finns Party, 4)
That Islam is considered to be “political” instead of purely religious is a relatively
widespread discourse in contemporary Europe. From a religious literacy perspec-
tive, however, such a strict demarcation between religion and other fields of human
activity is questionable. Moore (2015, 31) emphasizes that religious literacy involves
understanding religion “in context and as inextricably woven into all dimensions of
human experience” (italics in the original). A religiously literate person is able to
look past popular preconceptions about certain religious traditions or religion in gen-
eral and perceive the complex interconnections between religion and other facets of
human culture. In addition, the claim that the mosque “would represent Wahhabism,
disguised as Islam”, suggests thatWahhabism is not Islam. This is factually incorrect.
Furthermore, as scholars such as Taira (2010, 2013) have argued, religion is not a
clearly bounded entity to be found in the social world but a classificatory device that
can be applied to any number of things in order to advance goals related to them.
With the status of religion come certain (both official and unofficial) privileges and
burdens. The demarcation of religion is therefore inextricably tied to issues of power
and dominance.
Definitions can be used as tools for the governance of religion. The choice of
one definition over others may be used to legitimize religious restrictions without
appearing to violate the freedom of religion. As we have discussed above, a number
of electoral candidates emphasized their commitment to religious freedom while at
the same time opposing the proposed mosque. Such a rhetorical move was easier,
of course, if the mosque could be placed outside the boundaries of religion. The
same strategy has also been used, for example, in political debates in France on
headscarves and veils (Konttori 2015).
In contrast to those denying Islam the status of a religion, commentators with a
favourable attitude towards the proposed mosque tended to perceive it as a straight-
forward equivalent of a Christian church. A few of the statements even used the term
“church” in reference to a mosque.
I see mosques, just like churches, as places for practising one’s religion. (Male, Left
Alliance, 5)
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We do, after all, have churches representing other denominations as well. (Male, Left
Alliance, 4)
If we have a grand church [referring to Helsinki Cathedral], then why not a grand mosque?
(Male, Left Alliance, 4)
It is possible to build a grand mosque, just like the churches of all other religions. (Female,
National Coalition Party, 4)
One could question the term “Muslim church” by pointing out that, despite over-
lapping, the roles of a church and a mosque are not identical. Read in context, how-
ever, the choice of words here do not seem to imply a one-to-one correspondence
between the functions of the two buildings, but a very general idea of both being
houses of worship and therefore entitled to the same treatment.2
Besides perceiving the mosque as a “Muslim church”, the favourable commen-
tators tended to regard the activities of the mosque as internal affairs of the Muslim
community. The mosque plan was welcomed because Muslims were thought to need
it. A lack of space was perceived as the most pressing of their needs.
In a situation where there is a lack of prayer rooms and suitable locations for practising
religion, the grand mosque is an important project for the Muslim community. (Female, Left
Alliance, 5)
Reading the statements, one gets an impression of the Finnish Muslims as a more
or less insular community, whose needs do not intersect with those of the broader
society. In this case, the needs of the city are held as primary and the needs of the
local Muslims as secondary, if they are considered at all. In fact, several candidates
justified their numerical rating with a short comment: “Helsinki does not need a
grand mosque.” However, to quote Sicinius in Shakespeare’s Coriolanus (Act 3,
Scene 1), “What is the city but the people?” Whether the Muslims of Helsinki were
(implicitly or explicitly) included among the inhabitants of the city varied between
the responses. Perhaps not surprisingly, recognition of Muslims as inhabitants was
often associated with a positive attitude towards the mosque plan.
Muslims have the same right to practise their religion as all other people living in Helsinki.
(Female, Left Alliance, 5)
Everyone who lives in Helsinki, no matter their religion, has the right to practise religion in
suitable premises, so I support the building of a grand mosque. (Female, Feminist Party, 4)
In my opinion, the grand mosque should be built because it has a big influence on the daily
well-being of many people living in Helsinki. (Female, National Coalition Party, 4)
It [themosque] would not serve the interests of the people of Helsinki. (Male, Centre Party, 1)
However, even those candidates who explicitly included Muslims among the
inhabitants of Helsinki very seldom perceived overlaps between the needs of the
2It is also worth noting that mosques in Europe have adopted functions that are very different
from those of mosques in Muslim-majority countries but similar to those of European churches.
European mosques, for example, increasingly perform ceremonies such as weddings and funerals.
Allievi (2009, 21) refers to this as the “Christianization” of mosque functions.
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Muslim community and those of the broader society. Indeed, only a few commenta-
tors considered the possibility that it could be in the interests of the city and state if
the mosque was built. The few exceptions included the following:
With the help of a grand mosque, especially the young people with asylum status could
possibly be supported in their integration into Finland, and therefore it could be good for
Helsinki if implemented right. (Male, Centre Party, 4)
A grand mosque would enable dialogue between religions and, through that, increasing
understanding. (Female, Left Alliance, 5)
The mosque increases the value and diversity of the real estate. (Female, Left Alliance, 4)
It is important that an urban environment that is built in central locations be open and shared
by all. Hence, I hope that there will be, for example, suitable restaurants and other services
in connection with the mosque. (Male, Green League, 4)
Thus, to summarize, the candidates declared overall support for freedom of reli-
gion but were hesitant to apply it to the project at hand. Some candidates even
questioned whether the mosque project—or Islam, for that matter—is about religion
at all. Instead of being a site of religious practice, the mosque was perceived as a
political arena and channel through which foreign conflicts could seep into Finnish
society. The possible benefits of the mosque to the city as a whole were ignored by
all but a few respondents. In contrast, those favourable to the mosque plan tended to
emphasize the equivalence of a church to a mosque as well as the needs of the local
Muslim community.
4 Undefined Fears and Vague Worries
Sociologist of religion Allievi (2009, 60; 2014) has analysed European mosque
debates and noted that the resistance to mosques can be roughly divided into two
categories. On one hand, people are against mosque plans because of the concrete
effects that mosques are supposed to have—for example, property value decline,
noise, increased traffic, and violent crime. On the other hand, mosques are opposed
for cultural reasons, for example, because of perceiving Islamas oppressive towomen
or otherwise incompatible with European values.
Our data contained examples of both kinds of worries. Quite frequently, however,
the actual reasons for the opposition and suspicionwere not stated, and the candidates
only made vague references to general feelings of worry and concern. Usually the
vagueness appeared to stem from a lack of information, especially about the funding
sources, but it can also be asked whether at least some of these statements stem
from common stereotypes concerning Islam. Be it as it may, if we follow Dinham
and Jones (2010, 6), a religiously literate person acts based on knowledge, not on
stereotypes.
I feel suspicious about the construction of a grand mosque. (Male, Christian Democrats, 2)
Concerns are raised about the mosque funding that possibly comes from outside Finland.
(Female, Christian Democrats, 3)
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The project funding from Bahrain raises questions. (Male, Social Democratic Party, 1)
Funding concerns [me] a lot, too. (Male, National Coalition Party, 2)
At other times, vague statements seemed to imply an underlying presupposition of
shared knowledge. The candidates’ choice of words expressed confidence in readers
knowing beforehand about similarmosques in other countries and about the problems
caused by them. The impression was that candidates did not explicate their concerns
because they thought it was unnecessary, since readers would get the point.
For an electoral candidate, the avoidance of explicit accusations against Islammay
provide protection against being labelled a bigot. Only hinting at problems, instead
of naming them outright, allows for some leeway if one is called to answer for one’s
words.
Experiences from other countries are very bad. (Male, Finns Party, 1)
Experiences from elsewhere are not encouraging. (Male, National Coalition Party, 2)
Grand mosque plans have sadly turned out to be projects by the kind of actors whose aims
are not good for the traditional way of life of us Finns. (Male, National Coalition Party, 1)
As illustrated by some of the examples, the electoral candidates often made refer-
ences to bad experiences around mosques in other countries. Typically, however, the
mosques and countries in questionwere not specified.References to experiences from
other countries nevertheless illustrate the transnational aspects of mosque debates.
In particular, the arguments used against the building of mosques are often borrowed
fromother national contexts. (SeeAllievi 2009, 52–53.) Cautionary tales of extremist
mosques are circulated on discussion forums and shared on Facebook. Eventually the
tales become disconnected from their original context and turn into common folklore
among right-wing nationalists in Europe. Like fables and fairy tales, they are not set
in a specific time or place, but serve as a general warning about all mosques.
5 Conclusion
When quoting the candidates, we have included their party and gender. All in all,
however, such identities appeared to play a small role in the way that arguments for
or against the mosque were constructed. Similar arguments were used across party
lines, and where there were differences, they were of emphasis, not of kind. Christian
Democrats, for example, were especially keen to emphasize the Christian heritage of
Finland and the foreignness of Islam, but parallel views appeared in statements across
the political spectrum. Altogether, it appears that the discourses presented above are
common ways of discussing Islam and not limited to certain political stances. This
further supports the argument that the statements analysed here reflect not just the
views of individual Finnish politicians, but ideas that are relatively widespread in
Finnish society—or inEuropemore generally, as discussed in the previous paragraph.
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A key issue dividing the statements is whether Islam is just one religion among
many or whether it is a special case. Those favourable to the mosque tended to per-
ceive it as a “Muslim church” and therefore subject to the same laws and regulations
as any other house of worship. Those opposing the mosque, in turn, tended to treat
Islam as unique.3 Islam was perceived as a non-Finnish ideology that threatens to
import foreign conflicts into the country. Because of its association with conservative
social values and inegalitarianism, some commentators even denied Islam the status
of a religion. Such a perception of Islam is, of course, very one-sided and blind to
significant religious variation.
Even though themajority of the statements in the data do not explicitly promulgate
this kind of alienating discourse, they fail to provide a counter-discourse to it. Perhaps
the most typical stance taken in the data is that of “detached suspicion”, where
the affairs of the Muslim community are seen as being of little relevance to the
policymakers. In this case, the only reasons for city officials to be interested in the
wholemosque issue are their suspicions surrounding the funding sources and a desire
to reserve the same lot of land for some other purpose (for example, apartments).
Furthermore, very few statements mention the possibility of a mosque—or Muslims
in general—making a valuable contribution to society. This obviously constitutes an
additional blind spot in the mosque discussion.
From a religious literacy perspective, treating Islam as a special case is problem-
atic, but so is treating it as a faith like any other. Religious literacy involves the abil-
ity to discern both the similarities and differences between—and within—religions.
Therefore, simplified characterizations that either equate all religions or define them
through opposition should be avoided. Religions are better understood as “pools of
stories” (see Pauha and Jasinskaja-Lahti 2013) or as “baskets” (Hjärpe 1997), being
collections of disparate and often conflicting narratives, norms, beliefs, and rituals.
When crafting their religious identities, religious communities and individual believ-
ers choose some things from the basket and leave others. From this perspective, it is
fruitless to debate whether Islam is fundamentally a religion of peace or a religion
of war. The Islamic basket contains grounds for both interpretations. The mistake
made in many of the statements analysed here is in seeing only some contents of the
basket and confusing it with the basket as a whole.
What, then, could be done to correct some of the blind spots outlined in this paper?
Drawing on Moore’s (2015) approach to religious literacy, we would make four
suggestions. (1) Like Moore, we want to emphasise the internal diversity of religion.
This aspect is oftenmissing in the data. Davie’s repeated observation of “a lamentable
quality of conversation about religion” in Britain (Dinham 2015, 45) applies, at least
up to a certain point, to Finnish public discussions on Islam. Perceptions of Islam and
Muslims are all too often based onmedia images that tend to exaggerate violence and
terror. News from conflict zones provide a partial glimpse into Islam, but certainly not
3Other researchers have also noted (and critiqued) “the snare of exceptionalism” with regard to
Islam and mosques in Europe (Cesari 2005, 2007; see also Allievi 2009, 7–9). Instead of treating
Islam and Muslims as one religion or minority group among many, policymakers—and also some
academics—are prone to perceive them as an exception that needs to be considered separately from
other minority and religious issues.
22 T. Pauha and J. Konttori
the whole truth (see also Francis et al. 2015, 128–129, onMuslims as a risk or threat).
Religious literacy involves a critical attitude towards one-sided media coverage and
preparedness to learn the “other side”. In fact, as Lövheim (2012) has pointed out,
there is a need for religious media literacy.
(2)Another key point raised byMoore is the changing nature of religion. Islam, for
example, has gone a longway frombeing “anArab religion” to being a collective noun
for a diverse set of traditions all around theworld. Islam is no longer a foreign religion
in Finland, and it should not be treated as such. It is important to be aware of the
transnational links between FinnishMuslims and theMiddle East, but the role of such
links should not be overstated. The relations between Finnish Muslim communities
in particular cannot be explained only in terms of Middle Eastern politics.
(3) For Moore, it is important to perceive religion as permeating all aspects of
social life. Religion is not, and cannot be, confined to its own separate domain. All
initiatives that propose a total exclusion of religion from the public sphere are there-
fore doomed from the start. Typically, such initiatives place increasing restrictions
on certain highly visible forms of religious practice, and at the same time turn a blind
eye to other ways in which religion influences public life. For instance, the singing of
hymns in school celebrations is often framed as a Finnish national tradition instead
of a religious one, and the singing of hymns is thus considered to be permissible
in school, even though the practice of religion in general is not. This, in turn, sup-
ports the hegemonic position of the dominant Lutheran Church (Taira 2019). A more
nuanced understanding of religion and its role in public life may contribute to a more
equal society.
(4) In a related vein, Muslims should not be perceived as an enclave isolated from
the surrounding city. Muslims are very much part of the city, and what affects the
Muslims affects the city. Furthermore, aside from being a Muslim house of worship,
a grand mosque is also an important urban landmark. As such, it has functions that
go beyond the religious. By organising training and social support, a grand mosque
can fill the gaps left by other service providers. It may also attract tourists, host
school visits, and serve as an information point for anyone interested in Islam. All
these functions should be considered alongside the potential security risks posed by
a grand mosque.
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Laestadians in the Public Sphere:
Reading the Biggest Christian Revival
Movement in Finland
Tapio Nykänen and Aini Linjakumpu
Abstract In this chapter, we argue that the political and economic activities of the
members of the Conservative Laestadianism are often intertwined with the religion
and the religious notions of the movement. Many seemingly secular stances and
procedures have theological basis, while others rely and utilize the social networks
that originate in the church. However, the effects of the religion in the secular life
of Laestadians are quite diverse, and one should not oversimplify them. The impli-
cations of a person’s religious background can be positive for the members of the
movements and society as a whole, but the religious dimension can also have nega-
tive consequences in politics and business, especially in the context of strong social
relationships, bonds, and reciprocal links. Religious literacy means, at least partly,
that one recognizes the variable roles that religion has in different social contexts.
Keywords Laestadianism · Revival movement · Politics · Economics · Networks
1 Introduction
Conservative Laestadianism is the biggest revival movement within the Finnish
Lutheran Church and the largest Christian revival movement in Scandinavia. Cur-
rently, the movement has approximately 100,000–120,000 followers in Finland and
Sweden and some5,000 in theUnitedStates andCanada.Themovement is the biggest
branch of Laestadianism, a pietistic revival movement that was born on the spiri-
tual legacy of the Swedish-Sámi priest, preacher and botanist Lars Levi Laestadius
(1800–1861).
Most branches of Laestadianism are theologically relatively similar to each other
but socially more or less separate, independent and exclusive. This is also the case
with Conservative Laestadianism (CL). The movement’s established theology rep-
resents Conservative Laestadianism as the Christianity, and holds that the true King-
dom of God exists solely within the CL community. Hence, salvation can only be
found through actual, active engagement with this true church. Other branches of
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Laestadianism are considered aberrant and are rejected as offering false hopes. In
the Conservative Laestadian view, the Lutheran Church, in turn, offers “protection”
from “the world” but not more: true faith and salvation are only found in the parish
of Conservative Laestadians (the ecclesiola in ecclesia principle).
In this chapter, we will introduce two new perspectives on Conservative Laesta-
dianism. First, we scrutinize the political culture associated with Laestadianism in
its core support areas in the City of Oulu and its environs. By political culture we
refer to the habits and procedures typical of the political behavior of Conservative
Laestadians in the region. We begin by introducing the historical-theological basis
for Laestadian politics and then go on to describe two empirical examples in a more
detailed way: voting in elections and participating in municipal politics as elected
council members.
Second, we examine the business networks of Conservative Laestadians.We focus
especially on the way that religion functions as a resource for business. The anal-
ysis shows that the economic activity of Conservative Laestadianism is linked to
and benefits in many ways from the doctrines of the movement as well as the social
practices and the existing relationships. Among Conservative Laestadians, a theolog-
ical understanding supports participation in economic activities, and the movement’s
social networks feature simultaneously as part of the economic activity.
In terms of religious literacy, this chapter aims at understanding how Conser-
vative Laestadianism positions itself and how its members are acting in seemingly
non-religious spheres, i.e. how to understand religiousness in political and economic
contexts. We argue that the political and economic dimensions of the Laestadian
world are not separate or self-sufficient. Instead, they are—sometimes quite visi-
bly—intertwined with the religion and the religious notions of the movement (see
Moore 2015, 31). There are, for example, procedures and guiding principles that
have explicit religious connotations. Moreover, religious networks are sometimes
clearly embedded in “secular” networks, especially in business life (see Granovetter
1992).
This approach challenges the positions interpreting religious groups or members
of religious groups solely from the perspectives of religion or spirituality. When
researching religious groups, it is important to realize that the interaction between
religious and non-religious spheres can be complex and could even challenge the very
idea of religiousness. This understanding is crucial since there are several disputes
regarding the manner in which Conservative Laestadians and other conservative
religious groups act in society. In this way, “‘being literate’ suggests that one is
knowledgeable about religions and able to navigate the complexities of religious
domains” (Biesta et al. 2019, 3).
We have gathered research material for the project during the period 2015–2018.
The primary material consists of 39 interviews with politicians, entrepreneurs, office
holders and other stakeholders, who had experience in local politics, business or
both. The emphasis of the material is on the interviews of Laestadian informants.
In addition to formally organized interviews, we have had informal discussions or
consultations with some 40-50 Laestadian and non-Laestadian informants around
the region.
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Moreover, we have gathered material produced by the media, register data, mate-
rial produced by the Conservative Laestadian movement, as well as material drawn
from historical and genealogical sources.1
2 Laestadian Politics—Historical and Theological Basis
The official religious doctrine of Conservative Laestadianism has valued politics and
political participation at least since the early 20th century (Talonen 1988; Nykänen
2012, 2016). Theologically, the positive approach has originated in the Lutheran
two kingdoms doctrine. According to the doctrine, religious (divine) and secular
power are separated, but also secular power gains its legitimacy from God. Because
of this, a true believer should support secular authorities in everyday life—even if
the authorities are sometimes misguided and make decisions that are problematic
from the religious perspective (Nykänen 2012, 2016, 133–175). However, this does
not mean that one should refrain from criticizing authorities entirely: Criticism is
allowed but it should be moderate and reasonable, which means that a Laestadian
should not act in a disruptive way (Nykänen 2016).
In fact, the movement has encouraged a constructive attitude towards society. It
means that a believer should be an active citizen who does his/her best to enhance
the prosperity2 of the hometown. In practice, one should, for example, participate
actively in working life and vote regularly in elections. Participation in business life
is also associated with this approach.
In the 19th century, the movement often gave very precise instructions on how
Laestadians should vote and, in particular, how they should not vote. The political
left as a whole was considered problematic because of its atheistic and revolutionary
background. Also, supporting the Finnish Rural Party was condemned in the 1960s
because its politics was deemed disruptive (Nykänen 2012, 2016). Perhaps the most
imperative and explicit restrictions were issued in the 1960s and 1970s. Back then,
the movement struggled with internal divisions that were catalyzed by arguments
between themovement’s priests and leading laymenandby thegeneralmodernization
and liberalization of Finnish society (Linjakumpu 2012). Themovement’s leadership
tried to contain the situation by tightening internal discipline, which led to a more
explicit control over political behavior as well.
In the early 1980s, the movement replaced its general instructions with a request
to vote in elections. At the same time, politics and religion became more or less
officially separated (Nykänen 2016). This was at least partially a counter-reaction to
1The themes of the chapter are examined more deeply on Nykänen and Harjumaa (2019) and
Linjakumpu (2018).
2This interpretation originates in the book of Jeremiah: “Every human being, a religious one among
others, lives and works in the context of one’s own time and culture. But even the ones who were
forced to move and lived their life in Babylonia 2,500 years ago, received a request from God,
passed on by the prophet Jeremiah: ‘Also, seek the peace and prosperity of the city to which I have
carried you into exile’ (Jer. 29:7)” (Hintikka 2008, 134–135).
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the distressing atmosphere of the two previous decades. However, the old political
stance prevailed, and it still does in the late 2010s. Exact support numbers are not
available,3 but all studies strongly suggest that the members still tend to vote the
moderate political right (Talonen 2019; Nykänen 2016). Our research suggests that
The Centre Party is, as it has traditionally been, the most popular political choice
amongst Laestadians in Finland. The second most popular choice seems to be the
National Coalition Party (see also Talonen 2019).
3 Voting in the 21st Century
As was mentioned above, prior to the 1980s, it was a rather common practice within
the movement to give explicit orders about which party to vote and, in particular,
which party to avoid. Moreover, in some cases, believers were instructed to vote
for a particular Laestadian candidate. This was an organized way to funnel votes
to certain individuals (Nykänen 2012, 162). Based on our material, neither of these
is happening in the 2000s—at least not in such an overt manner. This, however,
does not mean that the members of the movement would not talk about politics and
political candidates. They do so, but usually the discussions are not arranged by any
of the movement’s organizations, such as the central organization SRK or the local
congregations. Instead, political discussions aremore or less spontaneous and carried
out from bottom up. The most common exceptions are Laestadian politicians, who
often campaign for themselves in Laestadian villages and municipalities. However,
official rallies are not organized in parish houses or during religious events. As one
interviewee stated, “the Centre Party is not the same thing as the Kingdom of God”.
All of our interviewees, regardless of their relation to the movement, claimed that
Laestadians still usually prefer other Laestadians in voting. It is not imperative to
vote for a Laestadian, but based on our material, it is a common practice. The most
typical explanation for this was that another believer shares similar values and can,
therefore, be expected to generally act in a desirable way in politics. As a Laestadian
politician put it, another Laestadian “might think similarly, a conviction somehow
represents thoughts in general”.
Another interviewee, a politician who had recently left the movement, pointed
out that sometimes Laestadian values do also have a concrete effect on politics. The
doctrine of the movement takes a negative view on particular social and cultural
practices, such as open expressions of sexuality, consuming alcohol and competing
in sports.4 When a Laestadian votes for another Laestadian, he/she can expect that
the candidate would not spend too much tax money for example on “building an
3Tapio Nykänen attempted to conduct a survey of the political opinions of Laestadians in 2011
during their annual summer gathering called Suviseurat. The movement’s central organization SRK
did not give permission to conduct the survey. According to the movement, Suviseurat is a religious
meeting, and politics should not be mixed with religion.
4Physical activity is not problematic as such—especially young Laestadians are often quite active
in playing games such as volleyball or basketball and generally exercising together. Competitive
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open-air dance pavilion or financing a sports club”. The interviewee also claimed
that many older members of the movement often vote for another believer simply
because the community has traditionally recommended so.
Many of our interviewees pointed out that there are only so many Conservative
Laestadians and that the religious community is quite close-knit. Word about quali-
fied and popular candidates spreads quickly in the network. It seems that nowadays
votes concentrate on top candidates often through this semi-autonomousmechanism.
In any case, the religious network can be seen as a valuable resource for Laestadian
politicians, who can expect to get a significant number of votes from fellow believ-
ers. Nevertheless, according to several interviewees, it is quite rare that a Laestadian
candidate would rely solely on fellow Laestadians’ votes. There are usually multi-
ple popular Laestadian candidates competing for the votes, and not all Laestadians
can be expected to vote for Laestadian candidates. Especially in national elections
Laestadian politicians usually campaign to appeal to a wider audience.
From the perspective of religious literacy, it is crucial to note that religious con-
viction and religious codes have effects on the Laestadian voting behavior and on
the way Laestadian politicians campaign. However, religious context or religious
rules of the community do not explain everything. Moreover, their role in voting and
campaigning changes due time.
4 Being a Laestadian in Politics: Values and Cooperation
Finnish municipal politics often focuses on making practical decisions concerning
the everyday lives of residents. Obviously, such decisions have a normative back-
ground, and, occasionally, the norms and values related to such decisions are debated
openly. However, in connection with religious arguments, values are relatively rarely
addressed in an open manner.
This does not, however, mean that religious values would be completely absent
from municipal-level politics. As was stated earlier, religious notions may affect
practical decisions such as “financing a dance hall or a sports club”. In case of
ConservativeLaestadianism, religious valuesmanifest themselves perhaps evenmore
clearly through the general style of political action: Laestadians should act in a
constructive way also in municipal politics (Nykänen 2012, 133–149). According to
the interviewees, it means that “discussion and listening” are preferred to separation,
let alone open conflict.
In addition to being constructive, actions taken by Laestadians are expected to
contribute towards “the prosperity of the city”. Hence, the general aim of political
actions should be to benefit the local community, not to raise one’s personal status or
to increase the power of the party. What constitutes the good of the local community
was often described in quite functional terms in the interviews. The interviewees
sports, in turn, are seen to require lots of attention and time, which may make it too difficult to
practice the faith in proper ways.
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reported that it is important to maintain a well-functioning school network, among
other things. This can be considered family-oriented politics, and the family is,
indeed, a crucial socioreligious institution in Laestadianism (Nykänen 2012, 133–
148, 2016). The movement is strictly against birth control, and Laestadian families
are still typically very large: it is not uncommon to have a family with more than ten
children. Hence, society’s support for large families in their everyday needs is very
important to Laestadians. According to the interviewees, family-oriented thinking is
often, if not always, clearly visible in the politics of Laestadian council members.
Even if Laestadian politicians do have some similarities in their political style and
agenda, generally theywere not seen to form independent or separate groups in coun-
cils. Instead, according to most interviewees, Laestadians and non-Laestadians alike,
they primarily act as members of their political group in the council and can engage
in cross-party cooperation as well. This was notable, as non-Laestadian interviewees
and many other non-Laestadian informants described Laestadian communities gen-
erally as somewhat introvert and even cliquish. Some interviewees explained that a
shared religion does not mean that the members of the movement would also have
to share their political opinions. Furthermore, some of the interviewees said that
religion is deliberately excluded from secular politics in order to ward off suspicions
of the existence of inner circles. One Laestadian politician noted that Laestadians
are usually a minority not only in the council but also in the political group, so
cooperation with others is also a necessity.
If Laestadians do not generally form separate political groups in councils, are they
still, to some degree, loyal to the religious community when acting in politics? Most
interviewees claimed that, in politics, Laestadians are primarily loyal to the political
party. However, there were also some contradictory statements. An interviewee who
had left the movement stated that, in local politics, one should be clearly loyal to
other Laestadians or at least other Laestadian politicians instead of the political party.
Another politician, a younger Laestadianwoman, stated that even thoughLaestadians
are generally loyal to their party and not to the fellow believers in politics, things
may get more complicated in some cases. According to the interviewee, especially
older Laestadian men tend to think that they are “somewhat smarter” than younger
female politicians. In some cases, this has meant that the interviewee in question has
been expected to conform to the views of the older Laestadian politicians and to act
as is “appropriate” in her role as a mother of a big family.
The above example shows how different networks may sometimes converge sur-
reptitiously. Although politicians see themselves primarily as representatives of their
party, the shared religious background of the older men and the younger woman in
question seems to affect their relationship in a political context. The Conservative
Laestadian community is quite patriarchal, especially in spiritual terms (for exam-
ple, women are not accepted as priests or preachers), and the social norms that are
constructed in religious contexts may well manifest themselves in secular interaction
as well. This does not necessarily happen because the movement officially would
require so: there are no religious rules that would make older men more competent
than younger women in political decision-making. Instead, the example shows how
Laestadians in the Public Sphere: Reading the Biggest Christian Revival Movement … 31
social structures that originate in religion may sometimes have unofficial but still
normative effects in secular life.
5 Economic Life: Religion as a Resource
In addition to being active in the political sphere, members of religious movements
can be active economic actors (see e.g. Dana 2010). However, economics is generally
not a core issue of religious movements or human spirituality: i.e. economic matters
are not traditionally associated with the spiritual dimensions of human life. On the
other hand, the combination of spirituality and economic concerns is often seen as
a personal matter, and as such, affords some degree of discretion. On the surface, it
does not seem appropriate to look at economic activity by associating it with religious
belief, and the economic perspectives of religious movements or their members may
seem rather marginal in comparison to their spiritual aspects.
Even though it may seem unusual at the outset to profile a religious movement
through its engagement in economic activity, there are numerous religious move-
ments in the United States, Europe and elsewhere with significant economic activity,
and Finnish Conservative Laestadianism is quite similar to these in many respects
(see Linjakumpu 2018, 15–18, 36–77; Dana 2010; Gauthier and Martikainen 2013;
Kraybill and Nolt 2004). In the discussion that follows, Conservative Laestadianism
is understood as a resource that influences and enables engagement in economic
activity. The resourcefulness of Conservative Laestadians manifests itself in three
ways: it is related to the (1) theology, (2) practices, and (3) social relationships of the
movement. It is not economic activity as such that is of interest here but, rather, the
prerequisites for it. We examine how Conservative Laestadianism as a network-like
social entity endorses economic activity among the members of the movement.5
From the point of view of the religious literacy, the examination is essential
because the complexity of religiousness and of the religious communality are identi-
fied in relation with the non-religious spheres of life. On the one hand, the religious-
ness does not determine the forms, conditions and prerequisites of the economic
life straightforwardly but, on the other hand, religious communality plays an impor-
tant role in the concretization of economic activity. Religious literacy implies the
contextual articulation and interpretation of this role.
5By economic activity, we refer in particular to entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs.We also include
economic activities such as working on company/institutional boards, issues of ownership, and
holding responsible positions in companies.
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6 Laestadian Theology as a Resource for Economics
Conservative Laestadianism, in particular the central organization of Conservative
Laestadians in Finland (SRK), determines the theological interpretations adopted
within the movement. These interpretations also apply to activities related to eco-
nomics. Although entrepreneurship as a theological issue is not very common in
Laestadian theological tradition, the subject is, however, addressed directly or in
conjunction with employment, or earning or possessing money (Linjakumpu 2018,
109–116). As was stated earlier, Conservative Laestadianism is often associated
with the Pietistic tradition, which was born within Lutheranism in the 17th century.
In Pietism—as with other movements representing Protestant Ethics—the notion of
work was strongly linked to the spiritual premises. According toMaxWeber, Pietism
in a way sought to secure salvation in secular professional life (Weber 1930/2005).
This Pietistic character is relatively easy to see in Laestadian theology. Work is a
very common area of theological reflections in SRK’s publications. Work is widely
respected within the movement, and the theological considerations associated with it
are abundant in the publications produced within the movement. Economic activity
is an act of service that serves God, the family, and society. Entrepreneurship is a way
of working whereby one earns a living for oneself and the family. It is also equated
with taking responsibility—not just for oneself and the family but, by extension, for
the well-being of society.
An entrepreneur can experience God’s blessing through his/her engagement in
economic life (see e.g. Lindgren 2011, 91). It can manifest itself as success, which
is an indication of God’s blessing for the entrepreneur and his/her actions. There
may not be any outward justification for success, but the blessing comes as if it were
a gift. The “dangers of mammon”—referring to greed, which makes money and
ownership problematic—constitute the reverse side of the entrepreneurial blessing.
In the theological sense, mammon—i.e. money and wealth—is an ambivalent topic,
because in the Christian tradition, poverty often appears to be an acceptable, or even
preferable, “condition” of a Christian person. The poors are blessed because they do
not “have the stumbling block of mammon.” (Hay 1989, 51.) However, the poor, or
poverty, do not have a special role in the theology of Conservative Laestadians, i.e.
poverty is not specifically referred to when discussing work or entrepreneurship.
Despite the risk of excessive mammon, pursuit of poverty is not specifically
encouraged in Conservative Laestadian theology. Theology is rather giving an
approval for entrepreneurship and earningmoney. In this sense, Conservative Laesta-
dianism has similarities to the prosperity gospel (Linjakumpu 2018, 114). However,
earning money is not a declared goal, but more like a matter that is not forbidden,
but rather treated with “a cautious sympathy”.
Theology of Conservative Laestadians is supporting—and resourcing—
entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs. It embraces the idea that entrepreneurship as
such is not problematic spiritually or in terms of conviction. Neither does it limit
everyday business practices unless an entrepreneur is resorting to excess. In particu-
lar, the attitude towards money and ownership affects how entrepreneurship appears
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within the movement. If earning is seen as a theologically possible endeavor, it
creates favorable conditions for entrepreneurship. By contrast, a positive attitude
to entrepreneurship can produce a positive theological assessment of money and
ownership, as is currently the case within the movement.
7 Religiously Motivated Practices as a Resource
In terms of religious literacy, it is crucial to understand that the theological tenets
of a certain religious movement do not directly or necessarily affect the worldly
life of a member of the movement. Instead, often theology constitutes a potential
that directs and supports the members of religious movements. The potential can be
concretized in the choices of life and in practical situations, but, at the same time, it
is also possible that it is not realized in any way.
In addition to theology, what also matters is how the movement functions in
practice. Conservative Laestadianism is indeed quite strongly based on practice, i.e.
it is formed in and through existing practices whereby members of the movement are
guided in desirable and acceptable directions. These practices are obviously often
connected to the “official” theological basis of the movement, but sometimes the
connection is quite loose and practices are rather based on social and organizational
solutions. For this reason, it is interesting to investigate what forms of organizational
support and approval for entrepreneurship emerge from Laestadianism.
One formof community-based support is linked to the official activity of themove-
ment, that is to say, the ways in which official organizations close to SRK or SRK
itself are promoting or advancing entrepreneurship. An important form of organiza-
tional support for entrepreneurship is the movement’s weekly newspaper Päivämies
inwhich articles, interviews and stories related to entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs
appear frequently. In 2011, SRK also published a book on entrepreneurship. Entitled
Mitä jää viivan alle. Ajatuksia yrittäjyydestä (”What’s below the Line. Thoughts
on Entrepreneurship”), the book includes 24 texts related to different aspects of
entrepreneurship. The authors are entrepreneurs, some of whom are also known in
public for their religious conviction and their membership of the movement. (See
Tahkola and Niskanen 2011.)
In addition, the movement organizes entrepreneurial education at the Christian
folk high schools it owns. Operating in three locations in Finland, the schools have
slightly different study programs, but each school offers at least some entrepreneur-
ship education. This entrepreneurship training, mainly targeted at Laestadian youth,
has gained a fairly important role in the selection of education in these schools.
The folk high schools also offer so-called short courses. Some of these courses
deal with entrepreneurship and are available in each of the three folk high schools.
The entrepreneurial courses—unlike the entrepreneurial study programs—were orig-
inally intended mainly for business people and their spouses. The entrepreneurial
courses are a well-established form of activity and they have been organized for
decades. The number of participants has been rising steadily and, today, a total
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of over 100 persons in all schools participate in the courses annually. In addition
to the general entrepreneurship courses, specialized courses have been arranged
for female entrepreneurs, senior entrepreneurs and even for children. Furthermore,
courses have been arranged for specific target groups such as bankrupt entrepreneurs,
entrepreneurs in the ICT industry and rural entrepreneurs. (See Linjakumpu 2018,
118–122.)
Publishing and the activities of folk high schools are tangible ways in which
the official organization of Conservative Laestadians supports entrepreneurship. In
terms of business-related activities or publications, it is not a matter of the formal
organization of the movement urging people of any age to become entrepreneurs. It
is rather that entrepreneurship altogether seems to be embodied in the movement’s
activities and practices: for Conservative Laestadians, entrepreneurship appears as
a “normal” and everyday matter, which is quite unconventional in the context of
religious movements.
Through the activities related to entrepreneurship, Conservative Laestadians are
able to build mutual trust, and in this way, the activities reinforce existing relation-
ships between people and create newones. They therefore support networking among
people belonging to the movement, although it is not necessarily a declared goal.
These relationships, efforts at building trust and working together can be seen as a
resource for entrepreneurially oriented people (cf. Portes 1995; Rothstein 2005; Gra-
novetter 1992). The organization builds a culture of entrepreneurship i.e. is creating
preconditions for entrepreneurship.
When thinking of Conservative Laestadianism from the point of view of religious
literacy, it is particularly important to be aware of the holistic and communal nature
of the movement (see e.g. Hurtig 2013, 46). Practical support for entrepreneurs and
entrepreneurship is part of the religious nature of Laestadianism. This is not a typical
way of acting among religious groups. In case of less holistic or communal groups,
there is no need for practices that are dealing with seemingly non-religious issues
such as business life.
8 Social Dimensions and Networking as a Resource
Although entrepreneurship may often appear as a practice of pursuing individual
goals and ideas, it is, however, essential to work with other people, i.e. customers,
business partners, subcontractors, financiers and employees. The social dimension
and the various relationships involved are essentially present in the implementation
of business activities. Entrepreneurial activity is linked to various existing social
networks and is therefore, by definition, a network-like practice. This starting point
is also essentialwhen examining business activities amongConservativeLaestadians.
The network perspective provides conceptual tools for perceiving the importance
of social contacts, communality and interdependence in the economic activity of
people belonging to the movement. In this way, economic activity appears to be
socially located and constructed. There is a wide range of contacts, interests and
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relationships between Conservative Laestadians in the context of economy. Follow-
ing the ideas of Mark Granovetter, economic relationships have become embedded
in social (and sometimes, political) networks (Granovetter 1992, 62–65). In other
words, economics depends on the relationships and networks in which different
forms of economics are located (see Johanson 2015, 206–207). It is based on social
relationships, and it is linked to these relationships. It should be noted that these
relationships are, in part, inevitably shaped by non-Laestadians, and in some cases,
they can also largely determine the logic of economic activity.
The concept of embeddedness means that the social relationships and networks
within the movement are part of the networks of economic activity or, more accu-
rately, the economic networks of Conservative Laestadians overlap with—or are
embedded in—other Laestadian networks. In practice, this means that Conservative
Laestadianism as a whole is seen through social relations, as a relatively broad, and
at the same time, a complex network entity of which economic networks are part.
The Conservative Laestadian way of life, the theological premises, and the prac-
tices of the spiritual community form a wide range of relationships that build net-
works. The local, regional and national practices of the movement contribute to
building relationships. The local Associations of Peace, voluntary work, and bazaars
intrinsically bring members of the organization together. Likewise, the regional or
national activities run by the SRK offer similar opportunities beyond the local level.
Summer services, regional services, speaker meetings, congregational days, large-
scale courses and publishing activities create contacts and relationships among a
substantial number of people. (Cf. Nykänen 2012, 96–109, 198–215; Hurtig 2013,
46–47.)
In addition to the “official” activities, unofficial practices build relationships
between people. The members of the movement spend time with each other: hob-
bies, neighborly help, and other informal communication between families, friends
and acquaintances are creating and maintaining social relationships. In all of these
situations, people meet other people, create relationships and trust, share information
and maintain friendship and acquaintance.
Therefore, the socially active Conservative Laestadian lifestyle creates, as if natu-
rally, networks between people. Networks built on concrete activities are encouraged
directly or indirectly in the doctrine of the movement. This way of life is strength-
ened by the official doctrine of the movement, in which the joint activities between
the Associations of Peace, the families, and the other members of the movement are
seen in a positive light.
When Conservative Laestadianism is understood as a network of different rela-
tionships, economically relevant relations are part of—or overlap with—all other
relationships, i.e. economic networks are therefore not a separate or autonomous
part of the other networks and relationships of the movement. Economic actors do
not work in a social vacuum: networks link economic actors with social interaction
(Johanson 2015, 207). This means that, for example, an entrepreneur cannot merely
think of, or pursue, his or her own interests and profit in the context of economic
activity, but must also take into account the prerequisites imposed by the social envi-
ronment. However, networks are not coercive or mandatory structures that define
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the content of an activity and the variety of choices that may be made. Rather, they
tend to provide structures that can be employed in many different ways in economic
concerns. (See e.g. Portes 1995, 12.)
In terms of religious literacy, in strongly communal religious movements, eco-
nomic activity is not separate from relationships among the members of those move-
ments, but they are essentially linked to each other. Thus, the effect of religion on
business activities cannot be understood without the existence of social relations and
networks. It should be noted, however, that the importance of these relations is not
the same for all people: benefits brought by the relations vary from person to person.
9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have analyzed the engagement of Conservative Laestadian people
in the political and economic spheres, or in the movement’s own terms, “the world”.
The research results help to understand the connection of religion to economics and
politics. We have taken particular care not to “religiousize” the Laestadian people,
i.e. not to see Laestadians only as Christian devotees. Instead, Laestadianism in “the
world” is interpreted as a social movement inspired by its spiritual background, but
simultaneously, as a movement functioning in the domains of earthly life.
An additional purpose of this chapter has been to draw attention to the fact that
research on economics and politics is at least partly blind to religion. Economics and
politics are sometimes seen as secular territories where religion has no significance.
The chapter outlines the religiousness of these areas: how religion is structured in
the areas of non-religious life, i.e. politics and economics.
To conclude, there are at least two mechanisms that mediate the effects of the
“religious faith” in the worldly dimension as well. First, there are some fundamental
theological/religious values that explicitly affect the secular life ofLaestadians. These
include, for example, the demand to not act disruptively but in a constructive way,
benefitting one’s “hometown”. Also, some regulations concerning open sexuality
and the use of alcohol are based explicitly on religious doctrines. Both value-sets are
visible in Laestadian politics. In business, the theological norms perhaps serve more
as a resource: they enable and support acting in business life.
Second, religious and religion-related networks are embedded in the secular—
such as political and economic—ones. In other words, people who know each other
from religious or religion-related networks easily form networks and enter into co-
operation in other contexts as well, such as voting in elections or doing business
together. These forms of co-operation may not be best described as “religious” in the
common—or even theoretical—sense of the word, but they can be seen as having
roots in religion and religious networks.
It should be noted here that the relationship and interaction of religion, or the reli-
gious community, and economy can also be examined from the opposite perspective.
In other words, religion does not only have an effect on economic matters, but eco-
nomic matters do also affect the religious community. This can be illustrated through
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an illuminating example offered by AdamDinham. Before the modern welfare state,
welfare used to be strongly the provenance of churches (Dinham 2015). Among
other effects, this relation engaged people to the parishes very effectively. Once the
relation was broken, churches lost some of their practical meaning in people’s lives.
In Conservative Laestadianism, the parish is still strongly connected to welfare, or to
be exact, to the material wealth and well-being. In practice, religion-based networks
help people in their everyday life: they offer several kinds of social capital, business
opportunities and political support (see Furbey et al. 2006). The embeddedness of
the networks is not necessarily the reason for being a devotee, as one can stay for
example in the business networks after leaving the religious community. However,
it creates cohesion and strengthens the religious network. When several good things
originate in the community, one does not want to leave it.
Based on our work, religious literacy means, at least, sensitivity to understand
the role of religion in non-religious contexts and in various social relationships and
structures. This implies that a religiously literate person also recognizes the diversity
of the effects of religion on social life. The implications of a person’s religious
background can be positive for themembers of themovements and society as awhole,
but the religious dimension can also have negative consequences in politics and
business, especially in the context of strong social relationships, bonds, and reciprocal
links. Hence, social, political and economic effects of religion are seldom (if ever)
one-dimensional. Instead, they are variable and different in changing contexts.
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Challenges of Religious Literacy
in Education: Islam and the Governance
of Religious Diversity in Multi-faith
Schools
Inkeri Rissanen, Martin Ubani, and Tuula Sakaranaho
Abstract This chapter seeks take part in an emerging research where religion is
approached as a whole school endeavor. Previous research and policy recommenda-
tions typically focused on teaching about religion in school, but the accommodation
of religious diversity in the wider school culture merits more attention. Based on
observations in our multiple case studies, we discuss the multi-level governance
of religious diversity in Finnish multi-faith schools with a particular focus on the
challenges of religious literacy for educators. The three examples we present focus
on the inclusion of Muslims in Finnish schools and in particular on the challenges
for educator (1) in interpreting the distinction between religion and culture, (2) in
recognizing and handling intra-religious diversity, and (3) in being aware of Protes-
tant conceptions of religion and culture. A theme cutting across these examples is
how they reflect the tendencies either to see different situations merely through the
lens of religion (religionisation), or not to recognize the importance of religion at
all (religion-blindness). We argue that religious literacy should be recognized and
developed as a vital part of the intercultural competencies of educators.
Keywords Multi-faith schools · Religious diversity · Governance · Religious
literacy · Islam
1 Introduction
During recent decades, Finnish society has become increasingly multicultural and
multireligious.Due to this there have been somechanges toFinnish legislation, so that
the FreedomofReligionActwas renewed, togetherwith acts for basic, secondary and
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upper-secondary schools, at the beginning of the twenty-first century (see Sakaranaho
2013). Thus, the growing diversity of Finnish society has been acknowledged by the
state, and legal adjustments made accordingly, in education among other areas. On
a more practical level, however, recent reports highlight that schools and teacher
education in Finland have not adapted sufficiently to the changed demographics of
Finnish society (Tainio and Kallioniemi 2019; Räsänen et al. 2018). An important
part of this shift concerns the growing number of students belonging to different
religions. In current research, religious diversity in education has mainly attracted
attention in relation to religious education in state-supported schools (Sakaranaho
2013; Rissanen et al. 2019). Furthermore, while Europe-wide recommendations for
policy and practices for teaching about religions in European schools have emerged
(Jackson 2014; OSCE/ODIHR 2007), these do not address the accommodation of
religious diversity in the wider school culture. Instead of maintaining the rather
narrow focus on religious education, this chapter takes part in an emerging research
where religion is approached as a whole-school endeavour (Ubani and Ojala 2018).
Religion as a whole-school endeavour, moreover, will be discussed from the point of
view of religious literacy andmulti-level governance, which to date have not received
enough attention in research on religious diversity and education in Finland. In doing
so, it will widen the perspective of current international discussion on religious
literacy that focuses on religious education to religious literacy in relation to a school
community as a whole (cf. Biesta et al. 2019).
Religious literacy is about the ability to “discern and analyse the fundamental inter-
sections of religion and social/political/cultural life through multiple lenses” (Moore
2015, 30). As a result of the process of secularisation in Europe, however, religious
literacy as a civic competence is getting weaker or lacking altogether (Dinham and
Francis 2015), resulting in a sort of illiteracy with regards to religion in public space.
In the field of education, criticism of secular normativity (i.e. the othering of non-
secular worldviews in educational thinking and practices) has emerged along with
discussions about post-secular society (Berglund 2017; Poulter et al. 2016; Rissanen
2018). Finland can be described as a post-secular society in which the secular system
of governance is encountering increasing religious diversity and a rising public pres-
ence of religion (see Nynäs et al. 2015). The Finnish state has official multicultural
policies that extend to efforts to support different cultural and religious identities in
schools. In practice, however, a gap exists between the official recognition of reli-
gious diversity by the state and the religious minorities’ experiences of inclusion in
schools (Rissanen et al. 2016; Rissanen 2018, 2019). It is our contention that discrep-
ancies such as this invite an analysis of religious literacy as a relevant component in
the skillset of education professionals in a post-secular context.
The challenge of religious literacy is apparentwhen looking at teachers and princi-
pals in Finland, for whom, as education professionals, religion seems to be a difficult
matter to cope with. The struggle to come to terms with religion is particularly
apparent in relation to growing religious diversity in Finnish schools, where Islam
is seen as one of the main challenges. Contemporary education professionals have
grown up and been educated in the rathermonocultural atmosphere of Finland, which
has not been the best environment for the development of religious literacy as a part
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of intercultural competence. It is also important to recognise that education profes-
sionals, on the main, share the position of the majority, possessing certain inherited
cultural, ideological and religious values that shape their personal worldviews aswell
as the educational practices in general (Rissanen et al. 2015, 2016). However, due
to growing cultural diversity in Finnish society, the state policies make demands on
principals and teachers to come to terms with this diversity and fashion the manage-
ment of teaching in schools accordingly. Moreover, principals and teachers in their
everyday work are faced with pupils who, especially in the major cities in Finland,
have grown up in a culturally diverse environment where different religiously based
values, beliefs andpractices (i.e. dress codes anddietary habits) are an elementary part
of their everyday life at school. Consequently, in order for education professionals
to successfully come to terms with and manage the growing religious diversity in
Finnish schools, it is important to develop their intercultural skills—and religious
literacy as a part of those skills.
Due to rapid social changes, intercultural competence has in recent decades
become commonly acknowledged as a key component of education professionals’
competence as an “ability to effectively and appropriately interact in an intercul-
tural situation or context” (Berry and Southwell 2011, 453). In short, the focus of
intercultural competence lies in encounters between persons with different identity
markers in different contexts. However, with respect to Finland, the role of religion
as an identity marker, and as a possible dimension of culture, has not received suffi-
cient attention in research on multicultural education in general and on teachers’
intercultural competence in particular (Rissanen et al. 2016). All in all, even though
teachers in Finland are highly respected professionals with a strong ethical orien-
tation and willingness to promote equality in education (Kuusisto et al. 2012), and
the high quality of Finnish teacher education has become internationally recognised,
developing teachers’ abilities to deal with cultural and religious diversity can be
underlined as an area that needs more attention.
Concerning intercultural competence, it is important to look at the challenges
of religious literacy among education professionals (teachers and principals). We
will investigate these in light of three examples from Finnish schools. These exam-
ples focus on the inclusion of Muslims in Finnish schools and, in particular, on
the challenges in: (1) interpreting the distinction between religion and culture, (2)
recognizing and handling intra-religious diversity, and (3) awareness of Protestant
conceptions of religion and culture. A theme that cuts across these examples is how
they reflect the tendencies either to see different situations merely through the lens
of religion (religionisation) or not to recognise the importance of religion at all
(religion-blindness).
Investigation of the aforementioned examples is based on qualitative data that we
have collected in Finnish schools in our recent research projects. The first set of data
concerns the inclusion of Muslims in Finnish and Swedish schools. Altogether 36
interviews were conducted with school principals (n = 10 in both countries) and
Muslim parents (n = 8 in both countries), who were positioned as mediators or
“cultural interpreters” in their school communities. This data was analysed from the
perspective of negotiations regarding the inclusive citizenship of Muslims (Rissanen
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2018) and different ideologies of diversity held by school principals (Rissanen 2019).
The second set of data focuses on the discrepancies between educational policy
and practice in issues related to the role of multiculturalism and religion in school.
The data was collected in a school in the metropolitan area of Helsinki by means
of ethnographic enquiry lasting one year, including interviews and observation. It
also includes quantitative data based on different members of a school community.
In addition, we also studied the policy documents concerning public education in
Finland (Ubani 2013, 2018).
2 Public Schools and the Governance of Religious Diversity
Coming to terms with growing religious diversity in Finnish public schools involves
different processes of governance, as the top-down policies implemented by the state
are not enough. Instead, a pluricentric governance based on interdependence and
negotiation is needed (see Torfing 2007; see Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Sakaranaho
2019). Hence, it is crucial to be aware of and look at different processes of steering
and implementation of school policies, which are undertaken not only by the state
but even more importantly by the municipalities and education professionals (see
Sakaranaho and Martikainen 2015; Sakaranaho 2018, 2019).
Finland employs aNordic type of state-supported comprehensive public education
where the aim is the equal education of all members of society. The role of schools
in implementing state policies on the governance of education has been discussed
extensively in research that highlights the issues related to citizenship, social cohesion
and the agenda of self-preservation of the nation-state (Mundy 2007; Weymann
2013). In the formation of the Nordic welfare state, a sense of nationhood has also
been connected with the development of a strong public school system (Buchardt
et al. 2013).
The basis for the current Finnish public education was developed in the 1860s
during a period of Finnish national awakening. As part of this development, the
responsibility for public compulsory education was shifted from the Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Finland to the municipalities. From there on, comprehensive
education in Finland has been an organic part of the state governance. The last
extensive reformof theFinnish educational systemwas undertaken in the early 1970s,
when the current system of comprehensive education was developed. In accordance
with this, the whole population of Finland would study from 7 to 16 years of age in
a uniform school system. (Sakaranaho 2013.)
The current Finnish curriculum for basic education articulates diversity as a feature
of all students, and it demands the recognition of different religious and cultural iden-
tities. In comparison with the Swedish curriculum, which is rather silent about diver-
sity and makes a distinction between the students’ “own origins” and the “common
heritage” (with the latter including “basic values of Swedish society”) in a rela-
tively essentialising manner, the discourse employed in the Finnish curriculum can
be described as non-essentialist and multiculturalist (Zilliacus et al. 2017). Recent
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research has pointed out that the ideal of strengthening cultural diversity is one of the
overarching aims of the current Finnish basic education system (Mäkelä et al. 2017).
When compared with the previous National Core Curriculum for Basic Education
(henceforth NCCBE), there is strong emphasis on culture in the current curriculum
(NCCBE 2004, 2014; Ubani 2012). In the recent curriculum, students are to “be
educated for a world that is diverse in terms of culture, language, religion and convic-
tions” and to view “cultural diversity in principle as a positive resource” (NCCBE
2014, 21).
Similarly to the current national core curriculum, in general theFinnish state policy
documents address issues regarding religious, cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity
(Ubani 2013; Sakaranaho 2013). In fact, as mentioned in the introduction, several
reports have placed Finland among the leaders in Europe in integration policies and
also in minority rights (Multiculturalism Policy Index 2010; Migrant Integration
Policy Index 2015; Varjonen et al. 2017). However, there have been strong concerns
about the implementation of such policies in practice (Fagioli-Ndlov 2015, 13). The
higher-level policies act as a framework, while schools are one of the implementation
contexts for how the national policies concerning multiculturalism and religion are
interpreted by the municipalities.
The central role of the state notwithstanding, the daily management and operation
of schools in Finland are municipality-based. Hence, the municipalities oversee the
application of the generic national guidelines in the Basic Education Act issued by
the Ministry of Education and Culture, from the descriptions of general goals and
time allocation in instruction and the national core curriculum to daily practices in
schools. In addition to state schools, the municipalities oversee private schools as
well. (Vitikka et al. 2012; Ubani 2013.) The important role of the municipalities
in relation to education is also evident in that municipalities in larger cities have
their own guidelines concerning the management of religion in schools; therefore,
guidelines may differ from one municipality to the next. As an example, one can
cite the question of girls’ swimming lessons or absences due to religious festivals.
These guidelines may include booklets, in-service training for principals, teachers
and other personnel, and maintaining an open or closed web portal. (Ubani 2018;
Mäkelä et al. 2017.)
To sum up, when compared to many other European countries, Finnish educa-
tional policy is characterised by a rather uniform educational structure. In this system,
the state officials at different levels of the administration interpret and implement
the policies without much negotiation with civil society. However, the one special
case in this quite uniform implementation system seems to be the governance of reli-
gious diversity in schools (see Sakaranaho 2018). In schools, principals act relatively
autonomously when outlining the different practices. Therefore, there can be great
variations in school practices with regards to religion in different public schools, even
in the area of one municipality. Unlike in many other countries, in Finland there is no
system of monitoring schools and their instruction. Instead, the educational system
is based on trust in the professionalism of teachers (Husu and Toom 2012). This also
gives room for principals to make individual decisions with regards to the handling
of religions in their school that diverges from practices in neighbouring schools.
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While in recent years there has been a policy-driven aim to increase civil partici-
pation in governance of different fields of society, in public education the autonomy
of the educational professionals remains rather uncontested. However, in order for
the governance of religious diversity to be in line with the general notion of trust
in the educational system, teachers’ professionalism should incorporate religious
literacy as part of intercultural competence. The following examples analyse some
challenges in religious literacy among educational professionals and, accordingly,
highlight issues where it is in need of development.
3 Distinction Between Religion and Culture
In the current world, the relationship between religion and culture has become more
complex. On the one hand, new cultural paradigms emphasise the need to recognise
the fluidity and internal diversity of religions and individuality of their followers, but
the reaction to this has also been the “deculturalization of religion”, with people of
faith defending the authenticity and universality of their tradition (Roy 2010). Thus,
distinguishing between religion and culture has political implications, and it demands
religious literacy. In the field of religious education, theway inwhich religions should
be represented and investigated in the classroom—as cultural phenomena or with a
focus on doctrines and truth claims—has been a much discussed issue. The cultural
approaches have been accused of misrepresenting religion in a way that does not
teach respect for differences (e.g. Wright 2004; Barnes 2006). By contrast, how the
ways of distinguishing between religion and culture steer the governance of religious
diversity in the larger school community is a less explored area, and it is our focus
here.Wehave observed howeducators sometimesmake distinctions between religion
and culture in a simplified and strategic manner. Some school principals legitimize
their assimilative demands by interpreting certain behaviour of parents or students as
“cultural” and, therefore, they reduce the importance of this behaviour and move it
outside the scope of religious freedom. In our studies, for instance, some principals
interpreted Muslim parents’ unwillingness to shake hands with the opposite sex as
“only a cultural issue”, and this interpretation was used as an argument to justify their
demand that adapting to the common way of greeting in the country is something
that can be expected from the parents (Rissanen 2019). Most of the Muslim parents
in our data did greet the opposite sex by shaking hands and did not consider this a
problem, but there were also those who regarded the choice to not touch the opposite
sex as a right based on their religious freedom.
As an example, one can mention a female principal who recollected how some
Muslim fathers were not willing to shake hands with her. When she was asked how
she handled the situation, she described that when a certain father had refused to
shake hands with her, at first she let him come to her office but later when the father’s
unwillingness to shake hands with her continued, she did not invite him to her office
but instead had a discussionwith him in the corridor as a sign of displeasure. It should
be noted that on no occasion did the principal in question explain to the father why
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she behaved with him the way she did. It is evident that the principal associated not
shaking hands with the unequal treatment of women and thus experienced it very
negatively (Ubani forthcoming).
Religious literacy can facilitate awareness of different types of behaviour among
Muslims but perhaps also more nuanced interpretations of the reasons, in this case,
for not shaking hands. Instead of showing a lack of respect for the opposite sex,
many of our Muslim informants interpreted not shaking hands with the opposite sex
as an act of respect. Thus, the same behaviour can lead to opposite interpretations,
and if there is no communication between the involved parties, it can cause grave
misunderstandings and, in the worst cases, even conflict. The aim in developing
religious literacy is to avoid such unfortunate outcomes.
On the other hand, we also observed occasions of where certain cultural issues
were “religionised”. Often the most identifiable and distinctive expression of what is
considered religion—but is rather an interplay of religion, culture, ethnicity, nation-
ality andminority position—becomes religionised and reified as a normative assump-
tion. Therewere situationswhere teachers gave examples of frictions betweenSomali
families in school, which in their view were based on religion—and Islam, in partic-
ular—but in reality were connected to clan division. The interpretations of these fric-
tions also highlighted the way in which teachers see Somalis as a uniform group. A
case in point happenedwhen some Somali mothers came to the school and demanded
that their daughters should not be allowed to play with some other Somali children.
The teachers knew that the division in this conflict was based on clanmembership but
nonetheless interpreted that the incident was in fact caused by religion (specifically
Islam). This particular case reflects a general tendency to explain conflicts and, more
generally, any inappropriate behaviour ofMuslim students solely in terms of religion
and hence to ‘religionise’ their behaviour (Ubani 2015).
It has to be admitted that the problems of religionisation are recognised by some
professionals in schools, who endeavour to overcome it by emphasising the irrele-
vance of Muslim identity. For example, many Finnish education professionals are
critical toward the current separative approach to religious education for the reason
that it makes Muslim identities “too visible” (Rissanen 2019). The ethos of secular
normativity is exemplified by the fact that even many of those professionals who
support the “celebration of diversity” in school leave religious identity markers out
of it.
However, we noticed that there are clear differences in how distinctions between
religion and culture are interpreted with respect to the (imagined) majority reli-
gion and minority religions. Protestant Christianity continues to play a significant
(although continuously debated) role as an important source of tradition and as an
identitymarker in the school culture,whereas Islamhardly ever does.On the contrary,
many principals perceived Islam as essentially religious and, therefore, not having
pedagogical relevance as an aspect of cultural heritage or as an identity marker of
the students that could be positively recognised. In other words, the intersections of
religion with other identity markers is recognised in the case of the majority religion,
but not in the case of Islam. The inability to recognise the role of Islam as a cultural
element or identity marker also relates to principals’ perceptions, according to which
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“Islam is not a tradition here”, reflecting a continued understanding of Islam as alien
to the Nordic context. Due to this “secular Protestant normativity”, in many Finnish
schoolsMuslim identities thus become visible only through restrictions and the diffi-
culties that their incorporation into the school culture entails. According to the views
of Muslim parents and teachers, this makes it difficult to increase knowledge about
Islam and counter the stigma attached to Muslim identities (Rissanen 2018, 2019).
4 Intra-religious Diversity
Another issue that is much discussed in the scholarly field of religious education
but less explored as affecting an entire school is the recognition or misrecognition
of intra-religious diversity. Representation of religions as monolithic entities can
maintain stereotypes and prejudices, but it can also be used as a strategy to counter
those by representing sympathetic and “sanitised” versions of religions (Revell 2012).
We have observed the inability of educators to recognize intra-religious diversity in
the everyday life of schools. As a result, religious diversity is governed in a way that
does not offer justice to individual pupils and families and may even violate their
freedom concerning religious convictions and expressions, as well as the heritage
of their cultural and national origins. For instance, in a school with many Somali
Muslims, “religion” easily equals “Islam” and “Muslim” equals “Somali”. In this
case, the Somali way of practising religion is regarded as an orthopraxis of Islam, the
tenets of which all other Muslims are then expected to follow. In this type of school,
Islam is sometimes regarded as an internal attribution that connotes aspects related
to, for instance, challenges in social integration, language and learning. In concrete
terms, this means that the challenges experienced among some Somalis in Finnish
society are also attributed to Muslim students from other ethnic communities (Ubani
2018, 2019).
An overly simplified understanding of the diversity within Islam is also reflected
in the ways of explaining the apparent differences in Muslim belief and behaviour
by placing them along a single continuum, described in terms like religious/non-
religious, radical/non-radical, conservative/liberal and extreme/non-extreme. For
instance, the success of Islamic education teachers in developing trust with different
families was explained by one principal in terms of him “not representing either of
the extremes”. The secular normativity imposed on Muslims, as well as poor knowl-
edge of the existing variety in Islamic sensibilities, can also be seen in demands to
“secularize Islam” in order to make it compatible with modern liberal society. As one
principal put it, Islam “needs its Martin Luther”, who would cut the “sharp edges”
of that religion and help Muslims integrate into the West.
Furthermore, the lack of understanding of intra-religious diversity creates issues in
practices of governance. The school principals’ ways of outsourcing themanagement
of religious diversity by letting a local imam or a single Muslim teacher decide what
kinds of adjustments to the school culture need to be made in order to cater to the
needs of “the Muslims” can be traced to understandings of Islam as a monolithic
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(and authority-bound) tradition. Principals’ efforts to consult imams may be made
in good will, but in actuality they can be experienced as an insult. For example,
the reactions of Muslim parents to the cases where principals have asked imams to
make statements on whether or not certain religious practices should be allowed in
school have been strongly negative (Rissanen 2018). One Shia parent referred to a
principal’s move to consult a local Sunni imam as an experience of being stabbed
in the back, and other parents who belonged to the community regarded the act as
an indication that they were not considered intelligent enough to make their own
decisions.
On the one hand, those Muslim parents who are regarded as well-integrated and
moderate are continuously expected to answer questions, take stances “on behalf of
Muslims”, be experts of their religion, and be able to represent the other Muslim
parents in the school. On the other hand, there were also principals who regarded
“Muslims” as such a diverse category that it did not have any analytical value—and
therefore could be ignored—while any differences among Muslims were treated as
individual differences. Considering Islam as “too diverse to be talked about” can be
combined with very stereotyping and generalizing views about it (Rissanen 2019).
In a way, appealing to the diversity of Islam sometimes becomes an empty mantra,
which is not based on adequate knowledge and instead used as an argument to justify
the efforts of governance of Islam through the strategy of religion-blindness.
5 Protestant Conceptions of Religion and Culture
The third challenge of religious literacy that we have noticed is the naturalization of
culture-bound conceptualisations of religion and culture, which indicates a lack of
critical cultural self-awareness on the part of educational professionals. Previously,
“neutral” and “objective” forms of religious education in the Nordic context have
been demonstrated to be deeply influenced by cultural Protestantism but in a way that
is not recognised by teachers themselves (Berglund 2014; Slotte 2011). Protestant
conceptions of religion and culture also seem to impact the practices of governance of
religious diversity in schools. In Finland, as a result of globalization and immigration
during recent decades, there has been a shift away from the national narrative of a
homogeneous Finnish culture. For instance, the national core curriculum seems to
avoid essentialising language by describing Finnish culture as diverse in its essence
(NCCBE2014).However, the naturalization of Protestant conceptions of religion and
culture is still prevalent in Finnish society. According to our observations, “Protestant
bias” influences interpretations of religion and secularity in the school context, but
this bias is rarely recognized.
The problem-centred discourse where Islam is seen as the main challenge for the
social order of Finnish society is fostered by expectations that Islam should follow the
same foreseeable logic as the Protestant tradition and its canonized doctrines; when it
does not, Muslim families can be regarded as “difficult”. Furthermore, religion-blind
views of Protestantism only as a cultural tradition occasionally lead to disregarding
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the right of non-Christians not to be involved in what they feel is Christian practice.
On an everyday level, this can mean, for instance, using the fact that a song is
traditional as an argument to support the view that it is not religious. Moreover,
statements that “we don’t celebrate any religious holidays here” in schools where,
for instance, Christmas is an important part of the school culture are good examples
of the naturalization of Protestantism (Rissanen 2018, 2019; Ubani forthcoming).
The nature of conceptions of religion and culture can also be identified in the
school personnel’s perceptions of what are considered to be everyday life practices
at school and their interpretation of guardians’ and students’ decisions. For instance,
student participation in school festivities that are based on or have strong references
to Christianity is sometimes debated. The end of autumn term traditionally includes
a festivity with references to the birth of Jesus, be it in the form of songs, hymns or
plays. What often happened in one of the schools studied is that the Muslim students
participated in the rehearsals of the songs or plays but then were absent without
notice from the school festivity when the presentation took place. In this situation, the
teachers emphasised the way in which students do not ask for permission to be absent
and the problems this causes when casting students in different roles, with the latter
leadingMuslim students to constantly be in lesser roles in various school celebrations.
Absences without permission also occurred during swimming lessons and city hall
receptions with dancing. Those explained as extra day absences due to Eid were
interpreted by professionals more as a practical problem or the custom of a certain
group in the community than a situation rooted in religious convictions or a sense of
not having a voice to negotiate religious rights in school life (Ubani 2018). A “secular
Protestant” mind-set also indicates a lack of recognition that religion is an important
thing for some students; discourses on the incorporation of religious diversity and
religious rights in school often reveal an agenda of “liberalizing students” from the
religion-based demands of their parents and religious communities, revealing an
underlying assumption that religion is not a significant identity factor for young
people (Rissanen 2018).
The naturalization of Protestant or Christian elements relates also to the way in
which professionals endeavour to promote tolerance through emphasising the simi-
larities in all religions. In reality, however, views concerning the “common basis of
all religions” may be based on looking at religion through a Christian lens. This
was exemplified by one principal who quoted Jesus’ words from the Bible (“let all
the children come to me”) to demonstrate that all religions promote the same posi-
tive values. However, only putting emphasis on the commonalities of religions and
holding the view that other religions are in harmony with the core of Protestantism,
since this tradition represents the “essence” of humanity, indicate a lack of religious
literacy and can be seen as a form of cultural minimization and a religion-blind way
of dealing with diversity (Rissanen 2019).
Challenges of Religious Literacy in Education: Islam and the … 49
6 Conclusion
While discussions on the correct representation and treatment of religions as part of
religious or intercultural education has been a much researched and discussed issue,
resulting in Europe-wide recommendations for policy and practice (e.g. Jackson
2014; OSCE/ODIHR 2007), in this chapter our key argument has been that more
attention needs to be paid to religion in the wider school culture, and that all educa-
tors—not only those teaching about religions—need religious literacy in order to be
able to develop equal and impartial practices for the governance of religious diver-
sity. In Finland, recent reports have adduced the inadequate adaptation of schools
and teacher education to the changed demographics (Tainio and Kallioniemi 2019;
Räsänen et al. 2018). We perceive schools and their personnel as official representa-
tives of Finnish society for religious, ethnic and cultural minorities in particular, and
the school essentially as a socialisation tool implementing state policies vis-à-vis its
citizens (Windzio 2013; Weymann, 2010, 2013). For these reasons, the question of
religious literacy of principals and teachers is an essential aspect to be highlighted
when evaluating and developing the governance of religion policies of the Finnish
state. In addition to intra-school culture, there is also a growing need and demand
for connecting the school more closely to the surrounding community and commu-
nities (Jackson 2014); these aspects have also been recognised in the recent national
core curricula in Finland (i.e. NCCBE 2014). In a post-secular context this seems to
require a new kind of understanding and discernment regarding the global, societal,
cultural, communal and individual aspects of religion (Ubani 2019), as has been
pointed out by Dinham and Francis (2015) and Moore (2015).
Based on our case studies, we have detected certain key challenges in educators’
religious literacy: these relate to perceptions concerning intra-religious diversity,
the distinction between religion and culture, and Protestant conceptions of religion
and culture. The case examples reveal education professionals’ difficulties in recog-
nising when religion is a relevant factor in the behaviour and interaction of different
members of the school community—andwhen it is not. In other words, our examples
depict both ‘religionisation’ and ‘religion-blindness’ as reflections of religious illit-
eracy. Examples of religionisation include attributing to religion some (negatively
perceived) behaviours ofmembers of a certain ethnic group, aswell as not recognising
features of the minority tradition as “cultural heritage” but instead as essentially reli-
gious. Examples of religion-blindness include moving certain behaviours beyond the
realm of religious freedom by interpreting them as cultural, not recognising religion
as a relevant identity factor of some of the students, holding religion-blind views
of the majority religion as only a cultural tradition, and naturalizing culture-bound
conceptualisations of the majority religion.
In other words, majority religion (Lutheranism) is often “culturalised” and
minority religion (Islam) “religionised”, with the exception that sometimes the
behaviours or needs of religiousminoritymembers are “culturalised” in order to legit-
imize the view that declining to accommodate these needs does not insult anyone’s
religious rights. Thus, religionisation and religion-blindness sometimes appear as
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intentional strategies for legitimizing policies of everyday governance of religious
diversity, but they also seem to originate from three areas where a deficit of religious
literacy is evident: a lack of knowledge about the internal diversity of religions,
problems in understanding the complex intersections of religion and culture, and a
lack of cultural self-awareness. Thus, we argue that the advancement of education
professionals’ religious literacy in these three areas is needed in order to ensure that
they are able to develop impartial practices of governance (Jackson 2014) that do
not arouse feelings of exclusion among religious minorities; generally, in pre-service
and in-service teacher education, attention should be paid to religious literacy as a
vital component of educators’ intercultural competence.
The development of “intercultural understanding”may be an insufficient approach
when it comes to providing tools for handling religion in public schools today. As
the examples presented in this chapter demonstrate, the reductionist treatment of
religion as a form of cultural diversity does not advance religious literacy, and it may
even lead to neglect of the specific challenges in encountering religious diversity
and incorporating religious identities (see also Rissanen et al. 2016; Rissanen 2018).
However, even though the education of teachers’ and principals’ competences to
deal with religious diversity has for a long time lagged behind rapid changes in the
social reality in Finland, recent years have witnessed several educational initiatives
that focus on the development of educational professionals’ intercultural competence
and also recognise religious diversity as an essential topic to deal with (Räsänen et al.
2018). To support and fuel these initiatives, several research projects funded by the
Ministry of Education are under way.
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Governing Divorce Practices of Somali
Finnish Muslims: Does Religious
Literacy Matter?
Mulki Al-Sharmani and Sanna Mustasaari
Abstract This chapter employs the concept of religious literacy to examine the
divorce practices of Finnish Muslims of Somali background and the roles mosques
play in issuing religious divorces. Drawing on field-based research, we argue that
Finnish Somalis, in their divorce practices, make use of both Islamic and civil state
laws, adopting non-binary approach towards both systems. We problematize the
essentialist notion of Islamic family law that is posited in opposition to secular state
codes, which one often finds in public debates on Islam and family law.We examine,
furthermore, how women’s unequal access to divorce (compared to men) in Islamic
lawworks in the Finnish context. In relation to this, we shed light on the complexities
of the role and authority of mosques in issuing religious divorces to women when
their husbands do not consent.We note thatwomen’s agency and access to divorce are
not merely determined by the legal systems but also by the intersecting structures of
power relations and resources in their lives. We conclude with some final reflections
on the relevance of the concept of religious literacy with regards to our findings.
Keywords Religious literacy · Islamic family law ·Muslim divorce · Gender ·
Governance of Islam
1 Introduction
ResearchonMuslimmarriage anddivorce practices inFinland is recent (Al-Sharmani
2015, 2017; Al-Sharmani and Ismail 2017; Al-Sharmani et al. 2017; Mustasaari
and Al-Sharmani 2018; Al-Sharmani 2019). The concept of religious literacy, in
particular, has not yet been explored in investigating Muslim marriage and divorce
practices in Finland or in the larger European context. In this chapter, our aim is to
fill this gap. Focusing on Somali Muslims’ divorce practices in Finland, we examine
the relevance of the concept religious literacy to the understanding of Muslim family
practices in Finland and the related issue of the governance of Islam in the country.
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We use the concept religious literacy to shed light on the complex, dynamic
and non-binary relationship of Islamic family law to relevant Finnish civil codes as
demonstrated in the divorce practices of our interlocutors. Somali Finnishwomen and
men often divorce (andmarry) in ways that integrate the two legal systems rather than
positing them in opposition to one another. We also highlight how the concept can be
helpful in de-essentializing Islamic family law with regard to women’s agency. Thus
we show how SomaliMuslimwomen’s access to Islamic divorce is not necessarily or
singularly impacted by the unequal divorce rights of women andmen in Islamic legal
tradition but rather by a combination of factors that differentiate women’s access to
family-based resources and knowledge of the two legal systems.
Our analysis is based on field research conducted as part of an Academy of
Finland project (2013–2018), which investigated how Muslims in Finland organize
marriage anddivorce in transnational space andhow theFinnish state understands and
facilitates their wellbeing.1 In particular, we draw on interview data collected from
divorced women and men and from family dispute mediators in 5 mosques,2 in the
period from 2013 to 2016 as well as four year ethnographic research in one Helsinki
mosque focusing on its program for family wellbeing (which includes mediation
and adjudication work in divorce cases).3 Our arguments are also informed by data
collected by the authors of this chapter from interviews conducted in 2017 with
leading religious actors in 8 mosques on their work in solemnization of marriages.
We structure the chapter as follows: The first section outlines how we understand
and use the concept of religious literacy. The second section describes the Finnish
context with regard to governance of religious minorities and in particular Muslim
communities. We also outline the state policies governing marriage and divorce. The
third section presents our analysis of the divorce practices of Somali Muslims in
Finland, using the concept of religious literacy. We conclude with reflections on the
relevance of religious literacy for scholarly and political debates about family law in
Finland and in Europe.
1This project was titled ‘Transnational MuslimMarriages in Finland:Wellbeing, Law, and Gender.’
The first author was the lead researcher in the four year sub-study titled ‘Transnational Somali
Families in Finland: Discourses and Lived Realities of Marriage.’ The second author was the
post-doctoral researcher in the sub-study ‘Governing Plurality: Marriage Practices and law.’.
2This research tookplace in the period from2013 to 2017.Thefirst author conducted semi-structured
interviewswith 5 divorcedwomen and life story interviewswith 5 additional divorcedwomen. Post-
doctoral researcher, Abdirashid Ismail conducted semi-structured interviews with 5 divorced men.
We are also informed by related data collected from interviews with 16 married women and men (8
each), conducted by the first author and Abdirashid Ismail. The first author and Abdirashid Ismail
also conducted interviews with members of family dispute resolution committees in 5 mosques in
Helsinki.
3The first author conducted this ethnographic research in the course of four years, which consisted of
participant observation as well as interviews with the mosque program organizers and participants.
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2 Religious Literacy
One of the main functions of the concept of religious literacy as an analytical tool,
according to AdamDinham andMatthew Francis, is to critique the notion of religion
as a problem, and to rethink the role of religion in the public sphere, arguing that the
boundary between the secular and the religious is not given or fixed (Dinham and
Francis 2015, 3).
Moore (2006, 2015) equally affirms the importance of understanding the ways
in which religion is embedded in everyday life. Moore views religious literacy as
the ability to “discern and analyze the fundamental intersections of religion and
social/political/cultural life through multiple lenses.” (Moore 2006, 1.)
The editors of this volume also put forward religious literacy as an important
conceptual lens to avoid two serious analytical pitfalls, particularly in relation to
governance of religious diversity. These pitfalls are: failing to recognize the relevance
of religion and how to engage with it; or over-determining its role and significance
in the lives of religious minorities.
We concurwith the above-mentioned scholars.We contend religious literacy is not
only limited to correctly understanding when and how religion plays a role in diverse
social processes. It also goes beyond having adequate knowledge of relevant religion
in a relevant context. Religious literacy, we argue, is also about acquiring an informed
understanding about the often dynamic and processual relationship that members of
a religious community have with their religious tradition. Hence, in this chapter, we
use religious literacy not to reveal some inherent truth about Islamic family law,
but rather to unpack and problematize essentializing notions about Muslim family
norms and practices and show how Islamic family law interacts in dynamic and non-
binarywayswith the relevant Finnish civil codes, as our SomaliMuslim interlocutors
navigate both civil and religious divorce.
We also note how religious understandings may evolve as part of a process of re-
engaging with one’s religious tradition in a new context where multiple factors are
at play. For instance, some mosques—in their roles as officially registered religious
communities undertaking the responsibility of attending to the spiritual needs as
well as the integration of Muslim families into the larger society—promote Muslim
marriage and divorce practices that combine and reconcile between Islamic and
Finnish laws.And some individuals also adopt new religious understandingswhereby
both Islamic family law and civil Finnish code have equal and connected role in regu-
lating marriages and divorces. Moreover, these understandings are acquired through
individual efforts to lead an Islamic ethical life (Al-Sharmani 2019). Such shifts in
religious understandings can perhaps be understood as part of an internal process
within the Somali Muslim community effort to reshape Islamic norms regarding
marriage and divorce as they navigate life of a religious minority in the Finnish
context and where Islam has recently been framed as ‘a problem’ (Martikainen 2014;
Al-Sharmani 2015). This internal process is what the Dutch scholar Veit Bader calls
‘internal religious governance.’ (Bader 2007, 874.)
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3 Multi-religious Finland and Governance of Muslim
Marriages
In 1923, Finland issued its first Freedom of Religion Act. This law affirmed the equal
right of individual citizens and communities to claimandpractice their religion freely.
Eighty years later with the issuing of the new Freedom of ReligionAct of 2003, a new
state discourse emerged that foregrounds ‘positive religious freedom.’ The country’s
new constitution, passed in 2000, also highlights the state’s responsibility to support
and strengthen the religious rights and identities of the diverse communities in the
country (Kääriäinen 2011, 158).
Perhaps one effect of this new framework for governing religious pluralism in
the case of Muslim communities has been that the number of mosques registered
as religious communities increased from a handful in the early 1990s to over 50 in
2010 (Ketola et al. 2014). Accordingly, there has been more visible role for mosques
in solemnizing Muslim marriages, mediating and adjudicating in divorce cases, and
involvement with families in various activities targeting married couples, parents,
and children (Al-Sharmani 2019). This does not mean that the work of mosques with
families is solely motivated or enabled by these policies, but it does mean that these
policies created legal and discursive space for the work of mosques in these aspects.
Marriage and divorce in Finland are regulated in the 1929 Marriage Act
(234/1929). Historically, the state had no role in solemnizing marriages; this task
belonged to Christian church alone. The situation changed as late as in the early
20th Century, and the 1929 Marriage Act gave all religious communities the right
to solemnize marriages, with a permit granted by the government. For mosques, the
right to solemnize marriage was particularly strengthened after they were able to
register as religious communities according to the 2003 of Freedom of Religion Act,
rather than registering as associations according to the 1989 Associations Act. In
2008, a law was passed to further regulate the solemnization of religious marriages
(2008/571, after 1 January 2020, 1157/2019). The new law stipulates that mandate or
license to solemnize marriages is granted to a person who is member in a registered
religious community, provided that the registered religious community supports the
permit. After the marriage ceremony, the marriage certificate must be taken to the
local register office and inserted into the population register.4
Unlike marriage, legally recognized divorce belongs to the sole jurisdiction of
the state. A divorce is issued by a district court upon a petition. No grounds for
divorce are required, but there is an obligatory reconsideration period of 6 months,
during which the divorce petition is kept pending. After the waiting period ends, the
divorce is issued automatically if the spouses or one of them renews the application.
If the spouses have lived separately for two years, the divorce is issued without a
reconsideration period.Religious communities do not have the legal authority to issue
state-recognized divorce, and the scope for private agreements about, for example,
4Contrary to some other European states, such as the UK, cases concerning disputes about the legal
validity of religious marriages solemnized in Finland have not been reported in the courts (see for
discussion, Mustasaari and Vora 2019).
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arbitration or applicable law is very limited. Hence, for Muslims in Finland, it is
often a case of legal pluralism where individuals use both Finnish and Islamic legal
systems to organize their marriages and divorces. We elaborate this further in the
following section.
4 Somali Muslim Divorce Practices
Somalis in Finland, for the most part, settled in the country since the late 1980s and
onwards through refugee migration and subsequent family reunification, following
the Somali Civil War of the late 1980s and early 1990s. With a total number of over
18,000, Somalis are the third largest migrant group in the country after the Russians
and Estonians. They are also the largest Muslim community in the country where the
total Muslim population is estimated around 100,000. This is a community that has
been confronting a host of challenges such as low employment rate, low economic
mobility, and racism (OSF 2013).
Somali women and men in Finland, predominantly, follow a two tier-system in
their practices of concluding bothmarriage and divorce (Mustasaari andAl-Sharmani
2018). When marrying, some couples conclude the marriage at one of the licensed
mosques, which then takes on the responsibility to do the paperwork needed to
register the marriage at the local register office. Other couples have their marriage
solemnized by an individual religious scholar, who may or may not be affiliated with
licensed mosques. This usually takes place either in the family home or a rented
party hall. Then the couples themselves take on the task of following the procedures
for registering the marriage at the local register office.
In the case of divorce, couples also follow a two tier process. They conclude a
civil divorce as well as Islamic one. There is no particular consequence that couples
follow in concluding both divorces. In some of cases, for example, a wife would seek
an Islamic divorce from her husband and the latter would agree to it. The husband
would then pronounce the divorce in the presence of the wife and some of her family
members, and then he would write a letter attesting to the conclusion of the divorce.
Then the wife would initiate the civil divorce procedures. In other cases, the wife
would initiate the civil divorce procedures and then would secure the Islamic divorce
from the husband.
Most of our interlocutors see both Islamic and Finnish legal systems as important
in their lives. Following Islamic legal rulings is viewed as an integral part of living a
Muslim life and of being part of the Somali community in Finland. Abiding by the
Finnish civil code is described as part of an effort to strengthen one’s place in the
society as a racialized citizen, and to facilitate the ability to claim certain citizenship
rights such as family reunification in the case of marriage or the ability to officially
remarry in the case of divorce.
Additionally, some of the interlocutors adopt a religious interpretation that advo-
cate adherence to both legal systems in an integrated way as an ethical Muslim duty,
rather than a practical necessity. This kind of religious understanding is being put
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forward by some of the mosques as well as increasingly being articulated by young
educatedwomenwho are actively pursuing religious knowledge. (Al-Sharmani 2017;
Al-Sharmani et al. 2017; Mustasaari and Al-Sharmani 2018; Al-Sharmani 2019.)
By using the concept of religious literacy to interpret the above-mentioned find-
ings, firstly we can steer clear from a reductionist understanding that posits Islamic
law in an oppositional relationshipwith Finnish civil code.Our interlocutors (whether
individuals or mosques) are not approaching the two legal systems as totally sepa-
rate but rather as belonging to one process through which couples navigated divorce.
Secondly, one has to take into account the underlying social, historical, and policy-
related factors shaping this approach. This is a context where many of the marrying
and divorcing couples are immigrants or children of immigrants who do not have
experience with codified Islamic family law. Instead, for the most part they orga-
nize their religious marriages and divorces drawing on uncodified juristic doctrines
from Islamic legal tradition in fluid and decentralized ways. This, we put forward,
may be facilitating their flexible non-binary approach towards both legal systems
unlike a situation where couples have to engage with two state systems to secure
both kinds of divorce. Thirdly, this is an immigrant community that has settled in
Finland fairly recently and who is striving for inclusion and social mobility in the
larger society where they confront racism, economic vulnerabilities, and to some
extent Islamophobia. And, finally, this is taking place in a context where state poli-
cies promote and enable the participation of registered religious communities in the
work of governance and creating social cohesion, particularly through the work of
these communities with families (Al-Sharmani 2019).
When women need to secure Islamic divorce from unwilling husbands, civil
divorce alone is not sufficient since women still need to severe the marital bond
according to Islamic law. But how are women in such cases impacted by the unequal
divorce rights in Islamic legal tradition which privilege men? In Islamic jurispru-
dence, men can sever the marital bond extra judicially through unilateral repudiation
(talāq). The divorce becomes final with the end of a waiting period (‘idda) that a
woman observes after the pronouncement of the divorce, which is three menstrual
cycles. Women, on the other hand can petition for judicial divorce (tatlı̄q) on specific
fault-based grounds. Women can also initiate divorce (khul‘) and secure it with the
consent of the husband in exchange for giving up their dower and post-divorce finan-
cial dues (Ali 2006). Both parties can also reach a mutual agreement to divorce that
entails a particular financial settlement (ibrā), often releasing the husband from some
or all his financial obligations towards the wife.
This legal construction certainly makes men and women’s access to divorce
unequal in Islamic jurisprudence. To put in check the privileges granted to the
husband, early Muslim jurists saddle him with hefty post-divorce financial dues
owed to the wife particularly if she does not consent to the divorce or is not respon-
sible for the martial rift. In contemporary Muslim majority countries, varying legal
changes have been introduced to the codified family laws, which draw on Islamic
jurisprudence, to restrict men’s right to unilateral repudiation and to expandwomen’s
divorce rights (Tucker 2008; Welchman 2015). Nonetheless, many Muslim majority
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countries still uphold unequal divorce rights. This also applies to Somalis in Finland,
who draw on uncodified Islamic juristic rulings to regulate their divorces.5
Our data, however, shows that it is not necessarily women and men’s unequal
divorce rights in Islamic law that primarily determine women’s access to Islamic
divorce. Rather it is a combination of factors that differentiates women’s access to
resources and knowledge, which in turn impacts their access to Islamic divorce. We
elaborate on this point through the following example from our interview data:
Jamila,6 a forty-two year old Finnish citizen of Somali background, was married
for over a decade and was mother of three children when she decided to end her
marriage. Jamila moved to Finland when she was in early twenties as the bride of
a Finnish citizen of Somali background. The couple got married by an individual
scholar in Somalia. They then concluded an official Islamic marriage in a notary
office of an Eastern African country where they applied for family reunification visa
for Jamila.
The marriage was not a happy one: Jamila’s husband did not want her to be
involved in managing their finances; was opposed to her wishes to pursue studies
and work; and spent considerable amount of his salary on outings with his friends.
When Jamila decided to get divorced, she knew she wanted to secure both a civil
and Islamic divorce. Being a Finnish citizen with a life and children in Helsinki,
securing a legally recognized divorce was an integral part of Jamila’s efforts to start
an autonomous life, and to be able to petition for child alimony. But securing the
civil divorce was not enough. According to her religious beliefs, Jamila also believed
that her marriage bond could only be fully severed with the securing of an Islamic
divorce.
Jamila secured the civil divorce, but the Islamic onewas challenging. Her husband
refused to divorce her, and there were no family members to whom Jamila could
resort and use their support as leverage to negotiate with the husband for divorce.
Finally, Jamila decided to resort to one of the main mosques in Helsinki. The mosque
family dispute committee called the husband and sought to meet with him to discuss
his wife’s petition for divorce. The husband was belligerent, rejecting the mosque’s
authority as a mediator and arbiter in the divorce dispute and even threatening the
family dispute committee with violence. The mosque mediators repeatedly tried to
reason with Jamila’s husband. Few months later, the husband called Jamila and told
her he did not want the mosque to be involved, to save his face in the community.
In exchange for her withdrawing the divorce petition from the mosque committee,
he divorced her by making the pronouncement in her presence and her neighbor, as
well as writing a letter attesting to affecting the Islamic divorce.
5The majority of the interlocutors were married in Finland. The few marriages that took place in
Somalia happened long after the Somali Civil War when the Somali Family Law of 1975 was no
longer applicable with the collapse of the Barre regime.
6The names of the interlocutors quoted in this chapter are fictitious. Life story interview conducted
by the first author in the period from 2014 to 2016.
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Jamila’s case reveals few noteworthy things. On the one hand, it illustrates the
interconnectedness of the Islamic and Finnish civil codes in Somali divorce prac-
tices. Jamila could not consider herself divorced and move forward with her life
without securing both divorces. On the other hand, her access to Islamic divorce was
challenged partly because of men and women’s unequal divorce rights in Islamic
jurisprudence. But reading Jamila’s case as a simple incongruence between Finnish
and divorce laws would be misleading. Jamila’s challenges also had to do with
multiple factors that illustrate the need for a religious literacy that takes cognizance
of the sociopolitical context in which her life was embedded.
It is a context where mosques as registered religious communities do not have the
authority to issue legally binding Islamic divorce. In addition, it is a context where
Jamila has no access to a court system where she can petition for Islamic judicial
divorce. One could ask: do mosques need Finnish state authority to be recognized by
members of their registered religious communities as having the authority to issue
an Islamic divorce? The answer is not straightforward and points us to a number of
underlying issues. It shows that what is religious law and how its authority is shaped
and recognized is contextualized and layered. It also sheds light on the contestations
around mosques as the moral actor fit to mediate and arbitrate in family disputes.
On the one hand the model of Finnish governance of religious pluralism creates
space for mosques to undertake this role notwithstanding their circumspect legal
authority. On the other hand, the divorce (and marriage) practices of many Somalis
also show that mosques are not always and necessarily the main body that undertakes
the work of marriage and divorce conclusion. Many couples resort to a network of
family relatives and individual religious scholars to navigate their divorces (as well
as conclude their marriages). And there are couples who purposefully avoid resorting
to mosques, particularly those run by members of their ethnic groups, motivated by
saving face and maintaining a sense of privacy within their own local community.
This partly may explain why Jamila’s husband was persuaded to divorce her so as
not to prolong dealing with the mosque, which is predominantly run by and attended
by Somalis.
Our final point is that it would be also misleading to simply attribute the chal-
lenges that some women like Jamila encounter in accessing Islamic divorce, to men
and women’s unequal divorce rights in Islamic law. We need to adopt an intersec-
tional approach that de-homogenizes Muslim women. Part of Jamila’s difficulties in
securing Islamic divorce also had to do with her weak family support. Her father, a
religious scholar who lived in East Africa, was able to mediate between the couple
frequently and successfully via transnational means of communications. However,
when he passed away, she lost that support.
Perhaps it is fruitful to compare Jamila’s case to another interlocutor, Deeqo7 a
thirty year old Somali woman who grew up in Finland. Deeqo moved to Finland
when she was very young, attained high level of education, and was well-versed in
Islamic religious knowledge. When Deeqo’s marriage broke down and she decided
to get an Islamic divorce, she encountered no difficulties, as she explained to the first
7Life story interviews conducted by the first author in the period from 2014 to 2016.
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author. She explained that her family was supportive and were available for her as
they lived in Finland. The husband, furthermore, could not afford to be belligerent
and refuse the divorce, as Deeqo’s family was fairly well-known and respected in
the local community. Deeqo also emphasized that she knew her Islamic rights very
well, and believed that her husband could not keep her in a marriage that she did not
want. Deeqo’s example shows us that her social resources, which were superior to
Jamila’s, enabled her to make religious-legal claims and interpret the law as being on
her side. Accordingly, Deeqo and Jamila’s encounters with Islamic law in a secular
Finnish context were quite different.
5 Final Reflections on Religious Literacy and Governance
of Islamic Family Law
In European debates, religious—especially Islamic—family laws or norms are often
depicted as problem or exception to the norm of “secular” or “neutral” law (Bano
2017; Grillo 2015; Bredal 2018; Shah et al. 2014). In the Nordic context too, Islamic
family law is increasingly represented as an “anomaly of secular society” (Bredal
2018;Mustasaari 2019;Mustasaari andAl-Sharmani 2018;Moors andVroon-Najem
2019). The problem of this approach is that it depicts secularism as the normative
ideal while failing to take into account the local historical particularities that define
“secularism” in relation to (some form of) religion (Mahmood 2015) and in the
process construct the distinction between private and public spheres. Accordingly,
this approach denies that there is any relevance for religion in the public sphere and
sees religion and religious norms as characteristic of the immigrant “other”.
In May 2018, for example, the Finnish Minister of Justice Antti Häkkänen, who
spoke in the ETNO-forum organized by the advisory board of Ethnic Relations,
stated that while Finland is an open and diverse society, there is no room in it for
Shari‘a Law. The Minister made the statement in the context of warning against a
‘parallel society’ where, for example, forced marriage and female genital mutilation
take place and are condoned (YLE 2018). Such polarizing discourse seems to prevail
despite the research-based evidence, which clearly points towards multidimensional
and oftenmutually constitutive interrelationships of secular and religious law instead
of an oppositional relationship of law and parallel legal systems (Bano 2017; Bredal
2018; Mustasaari and Al-Sharmani 2018).
These contemporary debates about Islamic family law whether in Finland or in
the larger European context, in our view, are prime examples of religious illiteracy.
Through adopting and repeating pathologizing assumptions and imagery of threat
that Muslim family life allegedly embodies, religious illiteracy plays a key role in
the process of legitimizing the marginalization of Muslims in European societies.
Furthermore, as Melloni reminds us, similar to basic illiteracy, religious illiteracy
can effectively be used as a tool of public policy not to extend political participation
and civil development (Melloni 2019, 6). When in political speech Islamic law is
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framed as a key threat that Western societies are facing, it is not only Muslims that
are being marginalized. Using promises of protection against the imaginary threat of
Islamic law as bait in political campaigns is to use religious illiteracy to mislead the
members of the public from debating issues that actually and urgently require social
reforms.
Thus, religious literacy is useful in shedding light on the layered ways in which
law (whether religious or secular) functions in the everyday life of Muslim immi-
grants. Our findings show that religion (in this case Islam) matters as a source of
norms regulating Somali intimate relationships. Women and men (with the help of
their families and mosques) draw on Islamic law to divorce even though religious
divorce is not recognized by the Finnish legal system. However, Islamic law and
Finnish civil laws are also interconnected in Somali divorce practices. Securing both
Islamic and civil divorce are important for many and the determining factors are
multidimensional. They include: Finnish model of religious governance, the history
of Somali migration to the country, the migrants’ living conditions and challenges
as religious and racialized minorities struggling for empowering membership in the
Finnish society.
Our findings also show the importance of intersectionality in understanding how
law (religious and secular) is at play in individuals’ life. It is not simply egalitarian
Finnish divorce laws or gendered Islamic divorce laws that shape Somali Muslim
women’s divorce claims and practices. Rather it is how thesewomen are differentially
situated with regard to structures of power and their access to relevant resources
such as family support, knowledge of both legal systems, access to effective mosque
mediation and adjudication.
Finally, religious literacy also entails taking note of how immigrants’ religious
understandings evolve and develop. In our study, the practice of applying and recon-
ciling both Islamic and Finnish legal systems in divorce practices goes beyond
fulfilling individuals’ pragmatic needs. For some interlocutors, it has become part of
a new understanding of Islamic law and pious pursuit of an ethical Muslim life.
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tural Britain and the Finnish welfare state. In M. Tiilikainen, M. Al-Sharmani, & S. Mustasaari
(Eds.), Wellbeing of transnational Muslim families: Marriage, law and gender (pp. 39–58).
London: Routledge.
OSF. (2013). Somalis in Helsinki. New York and London: Open Society Foundations. Retrieved
January 2, 2018, from https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/somalis-hel
sinki-20131121.pdf.
Shah, P., Foblets, M.-C., & Rohe, M. (Eds.). (2014). Family, religion and law: Cultural encounters
in Europe. Farnham: Ashgate.
66 M. Al-Sharmani and S. Mustasaari
Tucker, J. (2008). Women, family, and gender in Islamic law. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Welchman, L. (2015). Qiwamah and Wilayah as legal postulates in Muslim family laws. In Z.
Mir-Hosseini, M. Al-Sharmani, & J. Rumminger (Eds.), Men in charge? Rethinking authority in
Muslim legal tradition (pp. 132–159). Oxford: OneWorld.
YLE. (2018). Justice Minister: “No room in Finland for Sharia law”. Retrieved December 19,
2019, from https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/justice_minister_no_room_in_finland_for_sharia_
law/10218154. (22 May 2018).
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Prevention of Violent Radicalization
and Extremism in Finland: The Role
of Religious Literacy
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Abstract The chapter explores how authorities in Finland have dealt with religion,
in particular Islam, on the policy level with respect to the prevention of violent
radicalization and extremism.We understand religious literacy as a kind of sensitivity
among the authorities to religion and religious communities, in particular when
discussing and dealing with such complex phenomena. The chapter is based on the
analysis of two national action plans for the prevention of violent extremism, in
particular on how Islam and Muslims are addressed in these plans, including during
their preparatory phase. In addition, we draw on the extensive experience of the
second author with security-related issues at the Finnish Ministry of the Interior.
Finnish authorities have been very careful not to frame violent radicalization as
a phenomenon that would be linked to one religion or ideology only. They also
promote participatory governance in order to bring partnerships with Muslims and
other faith communities into governance structures and prevent violent radicalization.
This participatory approach can be explained not only by sensitivity to religion, but
also by some other contextual factors typical to Finland.
Keywords Religious literacy · Participatory governance · Islam ·Muslims ·
Prevention of violent radicalization · Action plan · Finland
1 Introduction
The terrorist attack in New York in September 2001 was a turning point in the
development of securitization policies in the West as well as in the activation and
emergence of violent political movements both locally and globally. During the
past fifteen years, terrorist groups have used Islam to justify the violence, and as a
consequence, manyMuslims and non-Muslims alike have suffered from the violence
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of these groups.Moreover, violent far-right ideologies andmovements inEuropehave
grown and become more visible. In addition to groups that base their ideology on the
national-socialist ideology and ideas of race, the number of anti-immigrant and anti-
Islam groups has increased. Therefore, life for the people who practice Islam has in
many ways become difficult, as their religion is often seen as being synonymous with
violence and, as a result, they face Islamophobia in their daily lives (e.g. Bayrakli and
Hafez 2018). Since 9/11, a generation of youngMuslims has grown to adulthood in a
context where Islam is often seen as an enemy of theWestern world and its values. At
the same time, as religion has become part of the ideological and political battles and
is actively being used as a tool to achieve different goals, the question of what kind
of knowledge authorities should have on the role of religion in complex situations
(see also Francis et al. 2015) and how they should consider freedom of religion in
practice has become more important and sensitive than perhaps ever before.
The events of 9/11 escalated the global war on terror and the related develop-
ment of securitization politics and counter-terrorismprogrammes aimed at increasing
national security (Wæver 1995). In particular, Muslims in the “West” were framed
as a threat or as “suspect communities” (Hickman et al. 2011), and their move-
ments, connections and possible radicalization came under surveillance. According
to Cesari (2012), as Muslims were constructed as an existential threat to the political
community, it simultaneously justified exceptional measures of securitization.More-
over, security concerns in Europe resulted in a paradox involving, on the one hand,
a desire to facilitate the integration of Muslims, and on the other, a perceived need
to restrict the liberties of the Muslim populations (Cesari 2012, 437). Hence, author-
ities and civil servants need to make decisions regarding how to prevent violent
radicalization and extremism, while at the same time there is a need to promote
tolerant multicultural societies and nurture trusted relationships with stigmatized
and securitized communities.
In this chapter, we will explore how authorities in Finland have dealt with reli-
gion, in particular with Islam, on the policy level with respect to the prevention of
violent radicalization and extremism.We will utilize the concept of religious literacy
(Dinham and Francis 2015), which we understand here as a kind of sensitivity among
the authorities to religion and religious communities, in particular when discussing
and dealing with such complex phenomena. In addition, religious literacy can be
seen as an understanding of the larger contexts underlying violent radicalization and
a willingness to ask more questions (see also Francis et al. 2015). Religious literacy
entails an idea of having at least some knowledge about different religious traditions,
but it primarily is a civic endeavour that supports the formation of a cohesive and
inclusive society (Dinham and Jones 2010, 6).
In addition to a sensitivity to and awareness of religion,we are also interested in the
participation of religious communities in the development of policies directed against
violent radicalization. It has been noted thatMuslims are increasingly included in the
different sectors of governance, and partnerships are being built between civil society
and the government (DeHanas et al. 2010). However, little reflection has taken place
on the role and participation of Muslim communities in counter-radicalization and
counter-terrorism activities (Spalek and Lambert 2008).
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The chapter is based on an analysis of two existing national action plans for the
prevention of violent extremism in Finland, in particular on how Islam and Muslims
are addressed in these plans, including during their preparatory phase. In addition, we
draw on the extensive experience of the second author with issues related to security
and extremism at the Finnish Ministry of the Interior. It is important to keep in mind
that the role of the second author has been instrumental in planning and writing the
national action plans, and hence, the analysis can also be regarded as self-reflective
to some extent. The first author has written the chapter as part of a research project
“Young Muslims and Resilience”, funded by Kone Foundation.
2 The Finnish Context
Finland has not remained outside the above-described European and global devel-
opments, even if the debates and policies related to security first emerged in Finland
later than in many other European countries. One reason for this lag is that Finland,
especially compared to other Western European countries, has remained population-
wise quite homogenous. The change began at the beginning of the 1990s when
immigration to Finland started to increase. At the same time, the number of Muslims
also increased as many asylum seekers and refugees from majority Muslim coun-
tries in Africa and the Middle East migrated to Finland. The first notable group was
Somalis fleeing the civil war in Somalia since 1990. They were not the first Muslims
in Finland, however, as a small Tatar Muslim community has existed in the country
for more than a hundred years—a Tatar mosque was built already in 1942. The Tatar
community has maintained its religious and cultural traditions, but at the same time
members of the community have become well-integrated with mainstream Finnish
society, the community is small (approximately 1000 people) and the people gener-
ally remain quite invisible for the general public (Sakaranaho 2002). Another group
of Muslims in Finland are those who have converted to the Islamic faith, but also
they are small in number. Therefore, the public debate surrounding Islam in Finland
has primarily focused on the fairly recent Muslim populations, most of whom often
have a refugee background, in particular the Somalis, but since the 2010s also Iraqis
and Afghanis. The estimated number of Muslims in the country is approximately
100,000 people, including the children of Muslim migrants.
The number of Finnish people who belong to the Evangelical Lutheran Church
of Finland has been decreasing, but still almost 71% of the Finnish population were
listed as members of the church in 2017 (Evl 2018). In general, religion in Finland is
perceived as a private matter and the society is secular, but at the same time church is
part of cultural family rituals, such as weddings, and it also has a role in many official
events, such as the opening ceremonies of parliament. The first Freedom of Religion
Act was passed in 1922. The rapid institutionalization of Islam in Finland since the
1990s has been driven by the need to become publically recognized and approved.
In addition, migrant associations have played a central role in the implementation
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of various projects aimed at integration, and thus, they have been necessary partners
for public administration officials (Martikainen 2014, 93–95).
The increasing presence and visibility of religious minority groups, Muslims in
particular, in the public sphere and institutions has challenged Finnish authorities to
consider how to strike a balance between already existing practices, on the one hand,
and religious needs and rights on the other. The Finnish debates taking place along
the “migrant integration–security nexus” have until quite recently mostly followed
the developments elsewhere in Europe (Martikainen 2019, 32–33). The influx of
asylum-seekers in 2015 sparked a vocal debate on possible security risks related to
(mostly male) migrants, sexual violence, terrorism and support for militant jihadists
in Syria.
The general attitudes of Finnish people towards Islam have been predominantly
negative. For example, in a recent survey 62% of Finns—the highest score among
the 15Western European countries studied—responded that “Islam is fundamentally
incompatible with [Finnish] culture and values” (Pew Research Centre 2018, 66). At
the same time, Finnish authorities have considered collaboration with the Muslim
communities to be of central importance, and they have supported the founding of
representative Muslim organizations in Finland, in particular the Islamic Council of
Finland (SINE) in 2007. SINE was funded by the government until 2014, when the
funding was cut due to financial misreporting (see Martikainen 2019).
3 Preventing Violent Radicalization in Finland—The First
Steps
Despite the fact that since WWII Finland had been almost entirely free of political
violence of either international or domestic origin, the country started to gradu-
ally develop strategies to prevent violent radicalization, driven by EU-level counter-
terrorism policies (Archer and Malkki 2012). The government of Finland has so
far introduced three Internal Security Programmes (in 2004, 2008, 2012) aimed at
enhancing security and safety broadly in different sectors of society. For example, the
latest programme focuses on preventing and finding solutions to security concerns in
everyday life, including homes, public spaces and work environments. In addition,
“acts arising from extremist ideologies” are mentioned, along with school shoot-
ings (Ministry of the Interior 2012a, 55). School shootings have been a far more
common concern for Finnish authorities than terrorism—the first incident regarded
as a terrorist homicide or an attempted homicide under the terrorist law that came into
force in 2003 only occurred in Finland as recently as August 2017, when aMoroccan
asylum seeker killed two people and wounded several others in the city of Turku.
In 2012, the government of Finland adopted the first National Action Plan for the
prevention of violent radicalization and extremism, and thus followed the steps of
other Nordic countries. The title of the plan, “Towards a Cohesive Society”, indicated
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its basic ideas: the plan and its measures targeted all forms of violent extremism
existing in Finland, not only religiously motivated violent radicalization.
Until publication of theNational Action Plan, knowledge about violent extremism
and radicalization in Finnish society was quite limited. The Finnish Security Intel-
ligence Service (SUPO) was the best-informed authority in this area, whereas the
level of knowledge and awareness among local police was quite narrow. SUPO was
responsible for counter-terrorism, whereas it was not entirely clear who was respon-
sible for the prevention of violent extremism and radicalization—a task that was
quite new at the time the first National Action Plan went into effect. According to
the Action Plan, “effective, preventive action requires extensive collaboration among
authorities and cooperation with civic society” (Ministry of the Interior 2012b, 20).
At the same time, however, theAction Planmostly focused on thework of authorities,
leaving the role of non-governmental organizations and communities quite vague.
The National Action Plan describes the radicalization process only in general
terms without making a distinction between different forms of violent extremism.
Religiously motivated violent extremism is discussed in parallel with, for example,
separatist extremist thinking and right/left-wing extremism.Moreover, possible chal-
lenges regarding religion and Islam are not specifically addressed. The Action Plan
also highlighted the fact that violent radicalization is not a community-level problem,
but rather an individual-level problem in Finland (Ministry of the Interior 2012b, 17).
This can be regarded as a balanced approach, especially when taking into account
the situation in 2012 during which time many other countries, such as Denmark,
the Netherlands and the UK, were mainly focusing on radical Islamist extremism
and terrorism. On the other hand, even the knowledge of experts about religion and
its role in the radicalization process was limited and, in general, contacts with the
religious communities were minimal.
One of the objectives of the Action Plan was to increase knowledge and informa-
tion about violent extremistmovements and ideologies among experts and the general
public. The Action Plan also included information about the situation and preventive
measures in other EuropeanUnionmember states andNordic countries. Onemeasure
in the Action Plan was to publish a situation overview on violent extremism twice a
year based on the information received from authorities. The report is an open docu-
ment that describes the phenomenon and related developments in a comprehensive
manner without providing details about individual people.
Another measure in the Action Plan was to hold regular roundtable discus-
sions with the media. Topical themes related to the prevention of extremism have
been discussed in these meetings, including such topics as whether media attention
increase the popularity of and support for the violent extremist movements; travel-
ling from Finland to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq; what terminology should
be used when talking about violent radicalization and extremism; and polarisation
and violent radicalization. Hence, one of the aims of the Action Plan was to improve
communication and collaboration between the authorities and the media, as well as
to ensure that the media had enough background information on the complex topic.
All the main elements and issues that are still regarded as priorities with respect
to the prevention of violent radicalization were already included in the first Action
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Plan: the importance of cooperation, of trust in the democratic system, of including
young people in the democratic processes, and of balanced communication. The
concrete measures, however, were strongly led by the authorities and the role of
non-governmental organizations as well as communities was limited. This situation
developed differently in the next phase.
4 Moving Forward—The Second Action Plan
The second National Action Plan for the prevention of violent radicalization and
extremism was prepared and adopted in 2016 (Ministry of the Interior 2016). This
time, in addition to the authorities, representatives of select non-governmental orga-
nizations and communities were also involved in drafting the plan. In general, the
level of awareness regarding the importance and sensitivity of religious issues had
increased since the first Action Plan. Therewere several reasons for this change. First,
knowledge about the complex role of religion in radicalization and extremist ideolo-
gies had increased (see also Francis et al. 2015). Second, based on the experiences
with the first Action Plan, it was quite clear that non-governmental and religious
organizations should be involved in drafting and implementing the plan. The third
important reason was the cooperation agreement that was signed in December of
2014 between the Ministry of the Interior and Finn Church Aid. As part of the coop-
eration agreement, FinnChurchAid and theMinistry of the Interior organized a study
visit to Washington and Minneapolis in the USA in spring 2015. The Finnish partic-
ipants on the visit were imams, representatives of the Lutheran Church and Jewish
community, and authorities from the Finnish Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Employment, National Police Board, Helsinki City and the
Helsinki Police Department as well as from the Finn Church Aid. Also, some young
Muslims participated in the trip. The programme for the visit was comprehensive,
including several meetings with representatives from religious communities in the
USA. In addition, the discussions and interactions between themembers of the group
during the visit guided the future writing of the Action Plan.
Consequently, the second Action Plan was drafted in broad cooperation with
authorities representing the government andmunicipalities, some religious and other
organizations, and individual people, among others. Muslim communities also had
the possibility to discuss the content of the plan and give their feedback. For example,
the second author of this chapter visited different mosque communities and Muslim
organizations and presented a draft of the Action Plan. The participants and commu-
nities had the chance to provide immediate feedback on the draft and also send their
written comments afterwards. Like the first Action Plan, the second Action Plan also
targeted all forms of violent extremism in Finland, not only religiously motivated
radicalization (Ministry of the Interior 2016, 14). Therefore, the feedback from the
Muslim communities was crucial in order to make sure that the Action Plan did not
stigmatize theMuslims. This was an area where the knowledge and experience of the
Muslim communities were needed. The Action Plan does not mention Islam per se;
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instead, the plan refers to, for example, the conflict in Syria and Iraq and to peoplewho
have travelled from Finland to the combat zones (ibid., 13). Furthermore, not only
mosques, but also churches and synagogues, are mentioned as religious communities
that should be included in, for example, cultural and global education at schools and
as places where students could visit to increase understanding and dialogue between
different religious groups (ibid., 27).
In Finland, the role of religious communities in the prevention of violent
extremism is regarded as highly important. According to the Action Plan: “Reli-
gious communities can strengthen people’s participation, social interaction and spir-
itual life. They can mutually support each other and take action if religion is being
hijacked as a justification for violence” (Ministry of the Interior 2016, 14). In addi-
tion, the Action Plan states the following regarding the capacity of the religious
communities to prevent violent radicalization: “Religious communities are experts
and credible actors in matters related to religious interpretation. Religious commu-
nities can support individuals and groups that counter the recruitment of violent
factions. They also play an important role in strengthening the communities’ resis-
tance to violence-inducing propaganda. Working together, religious communities
can act against violence and spread the message that violence can never be justified
on the basis of religion” (ibid., 18).
Based on the Action Plan, certain measures in which religion and religious actors
had a central role were initiated. For example, the Reach Out project (2016−2019)
was launched by Finn Church Aid. The objective of the project was to establish a
close-knit community uniting the authorities, organisations, various communities and
religious actors to work together under the umbrella of preventing violent radicaliza-
tion and extremism. As part of the project, the participants received intensive support
for their efforts at curbing violent radicalization and extremism. These activities
included, for example, seminars held in different parts of Finland involving author-
ities and representatives of Muslim communities. In addition, authorities were
provided support in issues related to religion, and mothers whose children had been
radicalized and travelled to/died in Syria were provided with support as well. The
goal was to make everyone’s expertise and experiences available and to spread the
knowledge about available services and best practices in different municipalities and
regions in Finland. From the authorities’ point of view, an important result of the
project was the increased cooperation between authorities and religious communities
and, through this collaboration, increased awareness of the role of religion in violent
radicalization. In addition, direct contacts with key persons in religious communities
who might be consulted when needed were created.
In general, knowledge about world religions among Finnish authorities is limited,
and therefore, there is a need for expertise regarding religious traditions, those of
Islam and Judaism in particular: these religions are currently seen as priorities by
authorities since Islam is used as a justification for violence at the same time as
anti-Semitism is increasing. Jewish communities in general are well networked and
they have efficiently advanced issues relevant for them in Finnish society, whereas
Muslim communities are less organized and they have been more passive (apart from
the Tatars) in relation to working with authorities and the state. At the same time,
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cooperation between the Lutheran Church and different authorities has a long history,
and often even one based on law. For example, priests and pastoral care are available
in prisons and hospitals. The diaconal work of the Lutheran church is well-integrated
in the field of social work in Finland and provides multi-faceted practical help with
various problems that people may have in life. In addition, the Church is invited to
give statements when new laws and other issues are being prepared that will impact
its activities and field of operations. Muslim communities do not automatically have
this opportunity. In addition to the lack of representation and organization, one likely
challenge to greater collaboration and interaction during the past years has been the
fact that the Finnish authorities have primarily seen Muslim communities through
the lens of terrorism and violent radicalization, and therefore, their interest has been
more problem-orientated.
Another example of a measure where religious communities have an important
role is the so-called Shoulder to Shoulder project, coordinated by Finn Church Aid,
which aims to combat hate speech and the hate crimes experienced by religious
communities. The aim of the action is to develop ways that religious communities
can use to support each otherwhen threatenedor attacked.Different activities include,
for example, holding joint events for different religious communities, staging peace
walks, making joint statements and providing visible support to those communities
that experience such a threat (e.g. cleaning graffiti off the walls of sacred buildings
together). This measure aims to decrease mistrust and conflicts between different
religious groups, such as Shia and Sunni Muslims as well as Jews and Muslims.
Terrorist groups such as ISIL have capitalized on the tensions between Jewish and
Muslim communities in their propaganda, and therefore, the kinds of inter-religious
dialogues and activities that support mutual trust are considered important.
5 Finnish Policies Against Violent Radicalization: Lessons
on Religious Literacy?
Based on our reading of the Action Plans for the prevention of violent radicalization
and extremism in Finland, it can be observed that the authorities have been very
careful in their choice of wording so as not to frame violent radicalization as a
phenomenon that could be linked to one religion or ideology only. In fact, the word
“Islam” is not mentioned in the documents at all. Sensitivity for not stigmatizing
Muslim, or any other religious community, can be considered as a token of the
increased level of religious literacy, but also as a necessary step towards engaging
and collaborating with faith communities in the future for the common good.
The authorities have also made a conscious effort to engage religious communi-
ties in the planning of the second Action Plan as well as preventative work, which
will likely be reflected in the final outcome. Throughout the process, the authorities
have also signalled that religion is not regarded as a threat, but as an asset in such
common efforts. One possible reason for this approach might be the long history of
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cooperation between the Lutheran Church and the authorities. This makes it perhaps
easier also for other religious communities to cooperate with authorities, and vice
versa. In addition, the neutrality of the Finnish state in relation to religious matters
(Martikainen 2014) has probably helped the incorporation of religious communities
in efforts at collaborating with the authorities. At the same time, however, it must be
noted that many Muslims are relatively new to Finland and the community is hetero-
geneous, and therefore not well-organized, which has an impact on the opportunities
for Muslims to influence decisions that concern them. The small size of the country
and possibilities for non-hierarchical communication with authorities in general, in
addition to the general level of societal security and trust, are other contextual factors
that facilitate collaboration between authorities and religious communities.
In Finland, collaboration between authorities and religious communities is even
included as a strategic guideline in the new police strategy on preventive work
(Ministry of the Interior 2018). Hence, Finnish authorities promote participatory
governance (DeHanas et al. 2010, 6–7) in order to bring partnerships with Muslims
and other faith communities into existing governance structures and to prevent violent
radicalization. This is not the case in all EU countries, however, and there are also
differences between the Nordic countries. For example, in Finland and in Sweden
civil society organizations and religious communities are actively involved in national
efforts to prevent violent extremism, whereas in Norway and in Denmark they are
not given specific roles in the preventative strategies (Ramboll 2017).
TheNordic countries signed a cooperation agreement in January 2015 to exchange
experiences and develop common methods for preventing violent radicalization.
Cooperation in research is also included in the agreement. Because of this close
cooperation, religious issues as well as collaboration between religious organizations
and communities are also regularly discussed. InDenmark, however, the civil servants
working in the ministries are advised to avoid contacts with religious communities,
which means that they are not able to ask for advice from religious communities nor
invite representatives from the communities to meetings or events. In the worst case
scenario, this strategy may lead to the development of parallel societies and decrease
the sense of belonging among some minorities. It may also convey a message that
religions are a threat to the society.
In Finland cooperation across different sectors, and between ministries,
researchers, professionals and civil society, seems to be easier and less hierarchical
than inmany other countries. One reason for this may be the relatively long history of
associations (including migrant associations) working together with public author-
ities through the implementation of various projects (Martikainen 2014). In addi-
tion, social cohesion is still quite strong and societal trust high. According to the
Eurobarometer (2017), the level of trust in public administration among the Finnish
people (together with people from Luxembourg) was the highest in the EU (77% of
the population). Ninety-four per cent of Finns reported that they trust the army (the
highest score among the studied EU countries) and 91% the police. Studies among
people with a migrant background in Finland show similar trends. According to one
population study, people with a foreign background reported that they for the most
part trust—even more than the native-born population—the social and health care
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services, the judicial system and the police: for example, 82.8% of them claimed
they trust the police, whereas the respective number among the native-born Finnish
population was 74.6% (Castaneda et al. 2015, 18−19).
In the European Union, efforts at preventing violent radicalization and extremism
are continuously developing, and it is one of the top priorities in the area of justice and
home affairs. In June 2018, the ministers adopted a proposal (European Union 2018)
regarding the European Union’s priorities in the area, including a proposal to develop
related structures and mechanisms. The European Union’s priorities in matters of
policy also include recommendations regarding religious issues. One priority area
has to do with prisons and probation, rehabilitation and reintegration, and one of
the recommendations is to increase the exchange of experiences on how best to
provide religious counselling in prisons and to provide guidelines on working with
and training chaplains, particularly imams, for prison and probation settings.
Cooperationwith religious communities is also supported by the EuropeanUnion.
In the priority area of local and multi-agency approaches, the recommendation is to
identify good practices and guidance for local cooperation in the preventative work
taking place between local agencies and non-governmental organizations, including
faith communities. Another priority area is ideology and polarization, where the
recommendation to the member states is to establish a joint overview of the different
approaches and experiences and explore possible further actions in relations with
religious leaders, communities and institutions, including the training of religious
leaders, pluralism, faith-related dialogues, funding and the monitoring of religious
institutions spreading a militant Islamist ideology.
Even though the level of knowledge regarding different religious traditions
and groups among authorities who work at preventing violent radicalization and
extremism in Finland is, in general, pretty low, the opportunity to collaborate with
religious communities greatly helps them overcome any gaps in information and
understanding. On the level of national strategies and action plans, such as the
National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism
(Ministry of the Interior 2016) and the new police strategy on preventative work
(Ministry of the Interior 2018), this collaboration is encouraged and even obligatory.
In addition, the wording and frameworks laid out in the action plans are important
tools for authorities and grass-root level professionals and they will help pave the
way for good practices and respectful and non-stigmatizing encounters, where both
the rights and needs of the religious communities as well as concerns for national
security may be approached and taken into account.
Regardless of the limited knowledge aboutworld religions and religious traditions,
Finnish authorities have been aware of the need to consider the role of religion in
public sphere, in particular in supporting societal cohesion and preventing violent
radicalization and extremism (see also Dinham and Jones 2010, 6). At the same
time as it has been acknowledged that “religion matters”, religion has been largely
perceived as a collective phenomenon that has been approached through religious
communities. Hence, less attention has been paid to understanding intra-religious
diversity, which should also be recognized as part of religious literacy.
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In this chapter, we have described the increased collaboration and partnerships
with Muslim communities, in particular through the experiences and viewpoints of
the authorities. In the future, research will need to reflect more the views of Muslim
communities regarding participation in counter-radicalization activities (see Spalek
andLambert 2008). Listening to and assessingMuslim voices regarding participation
and representation as well as the dynamics and possible tensions between different
actors and power positions would be a needed step in developing the idea of reli-
gious literacy further and what it could practically mean in the prevention of violent
radicalization and extremism.
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Conclusions: Religious Literacy
Promotes Absorptive Capacity, Inclusion
and Reflexivity in Society
Timo Aarrevaara, Tuula Sakaranaho, and Johanna Konttori
Abstract In this book we have sought new perspectives for religious literacy by
defining it as a governance function in society. This concluding chapter examines
the frameworks for creating new knowledge and skills for actors in the civil service,
in other service sectors and industry by considering the expositions of chapter authors
elsewhere in the book. As noted variously by the authors, there is no unified scholarly
debate on religious literacy, but there is a debate that should be recognised in Finnish
societywith its expanding pluralism by understanding how secular laws and religious
practices intersect will be greatly improved as increased religious literacy develops
in Finland. Religious literacy should be seen broadly within civil administration as
a key factor in its performance.
Keywords Religious literacy · Governance · Civil service · Absorptive capacity
In this volume, the focal point is religious literacy and illiteracy in secular society,
and the chapters have presented discussion on the theme of religious literacy in
different contexts of the religious landscape, where the aspect of utilisation of reli-
gious debate is a common feature. In the civil service, the theme can be viewed as
a performance factor. Requirements imposed on authorities’ capacity for religious
literacy increased during the 2010s. Religious literacy can be necessary general
knowledge for an authority but managing the theme can also have practical meaning.
Accountability, transparency and dynamism are key elements of governance, and we
examine this phenomenon with the concepts of absorption, inclusion and reflexivity.
Religious debates culminate in these modern characteristics of governance. To make
these principles a useful tool for a relationship between the operating environment
and the organisation, we have interpreted religious literacy as a contingency. This
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contingency may be the effect of the operating environment on building an organ-
isation or managing it, or finding ways to manage uncertainty (Aarrevaara et al.
2017).
1 Religious Literacy and Administrative Practices
Contingencies are effective and efficient features of organisations that support them
to do the right things at the right time (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Contingencies can
shape administrative practices in both loosely coupled religious communities and in
tightly organised administrative organisations. Professionalism in administration is
the ability to increase absorptive capacity, which refers to recognising and utilising
external properties in the actions and work of the administration (Schmitt and Klaner
2015). This comes out well in Teemu Pauha’s and Johanna Konttori’s chapter on the
mosque debate. According to them, it is not possible for an administration to pick
one definition over others. They identified tensions between electoral candidates’
commitment to religious freedom and their opposition to the proposed mosque.
The authors also referred to the sociologist of religion Allievi’s (2014) analysis on
European debates about mosques. He has noted that the resistance to mosques can be
roughly divided into two categories. On one hand, people are against mosque plans
because of the tangible effects that mosques are supposed to have. These include
the decline in property values, noise, increased traffic, and violent crime. On the
other hand, some oppose mosques for cultural reasons, for example, because Islam
is perceived as being incompatible with European values.
Religious literacy can contribute to the absorptive capacity of the administra-
tion to identify areas of activity in which the functions of civil administration are
important. Absorptive capacity also means the ability to bring out essential religious
themes, consistently deal with religious themes in stakeholder action, and the ability
of authorities to bring religious issues into arguments in civil proceedings.
Another important feature of administration is inclusion as a characteristic of
cognitive structures forming common perceptions. It can be seen as an ability to inter-
pret and utilise the new knowledge and skills of administrators in understanding reli-
gious literacy. In this book,Marja Tiilikainen and TarjaMankkinen present a relevant
perspective on tackling strategic opportunities and actions to increase the capacity of
governance. From this angle, reflexivity means capacity for strategic opportunities
and increasing understanding of religious literacy in government. According to the
authors, the typical feature of the administration is the tensions between existing
administrative practices and religious needs, and they call this more precisely a
migrant integration—security nexus. The result of this inclusion is an increase in
capacity that can utilise religious literacy and increase the capacity of civil adminis-
tration. By defining these contingencies, the administration canfind solutions or oper-
ational practices for significant religious-based problems in administration (Hamann
2017).
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The chapters in this book illustrate frameworks and practices that create the
absorptive capacity to recognise religious literacy and use it in evidence-based deci-
sion making. There is a need to develop common perceptions that underpin the
concept of inclusion as a means of understanding and interpreting religious literacy
in the public administration, the third sector and industry.
Nykänen and Linjakumpu point out that religious and religion-related networks
are embedded in secular institutions. These political and economic mechanisms have
not yet been sufficiently studied in the scholarly literature. Based on the chapters in
this book, religious literacy provides tools for government to operate in the framework
of multicultural and multilevel governance. However, different solutions are offered
in the chapters, depending on whether the aim is to influence tangible decisions
as in a chapter on the mosque debate by Pauha and Konttori. Another angle is to
enhance cultural diversity, as described elsewhere in this book by Al-Sharmani and
Mustasaari in a chapter on governing divorce. The task of scholars is to produce
research-based evidence for decision-making taking into account multidimensional
secular and religious law.
For governments it is a challenge to create capacity in public administration for
intra-religious diversity in practices of governance (Sakaranaho 2018, 2019). Based
on experience from schools, Rissanen, Ubani and Sakaranaho have noted that gover-
nance is effective if it is based on interdependence and negotiation. The tools needed
for better governance include more evaluation and development if governance poli-
cies relating to religion. Tiilikainen and Mankkinen point out that governments have
tangible needs to wind partnerships with faith communities into existing governance
structures. These include supporting people’s personal choices as well as preventing
violent radicalisation.
The third factor is reflectivity as an ability to predict future actions of civil admin-
istration. In the past few years, there has been a strong trend in Europe to boost the
administration’s ability to engage in societal interaction on key issues, and to draw
conclusions from the dialogue about the future (Rask et al. 2018). Aini Linjakumpu
and Tapio Nykänen found religiously-motivated practices and social networking. For
them, religious literacy is a key skill that the administration needs to have to hold a
debate on entrepreneurship as one of the major drivers of society and the economy.
A credible administrative review of these themes means a consistent dialogue with
ethics and environment. It is a large challenge that this dialogue has a common frame-
work and concepts that make it possible to set common goals and conclusions for
different groups in this debate. Without this dialogue, significant resources related
to the religion cannot be identified and recognized.
The above-mentioned three areas of religious literacy in civil service are combined
with the drive for dynamic control, which refers to the ability of policy making to
handle issues in a rapidly changing environment requiring a continuous dialogue
about policies regarding religious themes in society. In this framework, dynamic
governance refers to dynamic interactions between key actors as an exploratory,
inductive approach in setting performance standards for good governance.
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2 Towards Conceptual Frameworks of Religious Literacy
Religious literacy is a unifying factor between the chapters of this book and serves as
a conversation and framework for the meaning of religion in society. Thus, religious
literacy does not constitute a unified scholarly debate, but rather a framework that can
be interpreted by building capacity for governance, decision-making and social inter-
action. The aim of this summary is to bring out different contexts of religious literacy
and find similarities and dissimilarities of understanding religious literacy. Here we
also want to contribute to the debate concerning a useful conceptual framework of
religious literacy in secular societies.
Our assumption in this book is that religious literacy is a pressing matter in all
fields of a pluralistic society. The chapters confirm this view, but partly on different
grounds. The chapter on Somali Finnish Divorce Practices by Mulki Al-Sharmani
and SannaMustasaari, describes the approach of Islamic and Civic State Laws taking
place in Finnish society governing religious pluralism. The chapter highlights the
need to develop a religious literacy concept. Through this concept, actors in the
divorce process can understand the factors that support the equal treatment of parties
in administration and in the courts. Understanding the intersectionality of religious
and secular laws can also provide enlightenment of the means by which it is possible
for actors to be heard.
In this book, there is also criticism of the approach of interpreting religions as
a special case. Religious identities, religious communities and individual believers
choose some things from the religious basket and leave others behind. From a gover-
nance point of view, it is essential to identify the more important factors through
religious literacy. The development of concepts and frameworks can enable author-
ities to identify essential problems and provide opportunities for discussion. From
this perspective, religious literacy is social and civic competence in a pluralistic,
welfare society.
The complexity of the religious questions in secular societies means that simply
understanding the theme cannot provide guidance to the administration. Instead, the
development of concepts and frameworks can enable authorities to identify the main
problems and provide opportunities for discussion. From this perspective, religious
literacy is needed in a social and welfare society. Multi-level governance means
that religious communities can also become involved in individual solutions, social
argumentation and decision-making.
The development of widely accepted concepts can be of decisive importance
for trust-based and open-minded discussion between those involved in religion. It
is largely about the themes that involve participation and discourse in decision-
making and administration to promote the human capital of religious communities,
and information and skilful actions in cooperation with the administration.
The chapters in the book deal with Finland, the civil administration of which has
long been based on shared values. Finland makes an interesting reference country
because multiculturalism has quickly become an important argument in society’s
decision-making and administration. In a chapter on religious literacy in education,
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Inkeri Rissanen, Martin Ubani and Tuula Sakaranaho define the role of multicul-
turalism and religion at school. For the older rather than the younger generations,
religion seems to be a difficult matter to cope with. For the authorities such as prin-
cipals and teachers, the relationship between religion and culture has become more
complex in the 2010s.
The chapters in this book indicate that there are new data and frameworks that can
be used to find interpretations and solutions to difficult problems concerning social,
cultural and religious diversity. Although the themes and data in the chapters are
different, common concepts can be found for them. Religious literacy in this context
appears to be an argument for the decentralization of administration in a multi-level
governance framework. Multilevel governance also implies a strong consideration of
cultures and religions as a resource and a tool for shared practices between religious
communities and the administration.
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